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ABSTRACT 
Policymakers often use tax incentives to encourage desirable taxpayer behavior, and 
researchers from multiple disciplines provide evidence that these incentives lead to behavioral 
change.  A new stream of literature focuses on the factors that affect the extent to which tax 
incentives achieve this goal, with specific emphasis on the factor of complexity.  This study 
expands this literature by investigating the effect of eligibility determination complexity and tax 
incentive structure on the relationship between incentives and taxpayer behavior.  Based on the 
findings from research on the take-up of social benefits, I predict and find some evidence that 
taxpayers are more likely to respond to a tax incentive when determining eligibility for the 
incentive is less complex.  In response to preferences for the credit structure in legal and 
economics literature and a similar preference in the business press, I predict, but do not find, that 
taxpayers are more likely to respond to a tax incentive structured as a credit versus an 
economically equivalent deduction.  However, I do find evidence to suggest that structure is 
important when eligibility determination complexity is high – taxpayers seem to be less likely to 
behave as incentivized given an increase in eligibility determination complexity in a credit 
structure.  This finding of a significant interaction between a form of complexity and incentive 
structure should motivate researchers to include a manipulation of incentive structure in future 
complexity studies.  Results of my study should also be of interest to tax policymakers at various 
levels of government as I find evidence suggesting a wholesale switch in tax incentives to the 
credit structure (a change advocated by many legal and economics researchers) could weaken 
taxpayer response when the credit features high eligibility determination complexity.
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 While the primary goal of the United States (US) tax system is the generation of revenue 
to fund the activities of government, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) is frequently used to 
encourage (discourage) behavior deemed desirable (undesirable) by Congress.  These behavioral 
changes are incentivized through preferential tax rates, income exclusions, deductions, and/or 
credits.  Because the goal of these tax incentives is to change taxpayer behavior, it is important to 
gain a greater understanding of factors that impact the extent to which these incentives are 
effective in changing taxpayer behavior.  Researchers have recently focused their attention on 
one such factor – complexity (Morrow and Rupert 2015, Bobek, Chen, Hageman, and Tian 2016, 
Morrow, Stinson, and Doxey 2018).  The primary goal of this study is to extend this research by 
further investigating the role of complexity in the relationship between tax incentives and 
taxpayer behavior.  Specifically, I aim to determine whether differences in the difficulty of 
determining eligibility for a tax incentive and differences in tax incentive structure affect the 
extent to which a tax incentive changes taxpayer behavior.  Per Slemrod (2005), “there is no 
consensus regarding what constitutes complexity” (281).  For the purpose of this paper, 
complexity refers to the difficulty a taxpayer faces when interacting with tax laws that establish 
tax incentives.  This includes, for example, difficulty encountered in determining eligibility for a 
tax incentive, in determining the timing of the tax incentive, and in determining the actual tax 
effect of the tax incentive through tax calculations. 
 The idea that complexity can affect the extent to which taxpayers change their behavior 
in response to tax incentives is logical and intuitive.  In fact, studies cited above provide some 
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evidence that complexity affects taxpayer behavior when a certain behavior is incentivized.  
However, complexity in the tax environment is multi-faceted and can be operationalized in a 
study in various ways.  To better understand how complexity moderates the relationship between 
tax incentives and taxpayer behavior, more research is required.  My study answers the call of 
Bobek et al. (2016) for additional research to determine the effects of different forms of 
complexity.   
In this study I predict that taxpayers will be more likely to respond to tax incentives when 
determining eligibility for the incentive is less complex.  I refer to this continuum of complexity 
going forward as “eligibility determination complexity.”  Researchers in other (non-accounting) 
disciplines have studied a similar variable under a different name – “hassle” costs – and have 
found evidence to suggest it significantly (negatively) affects the take-up1 of social benefits 
programs like the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC), and Medicaid (Currie 2006, Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2006, Bhargava and 
Manoli 2015).  The stakes are often quite high for the individuals eligible to participate in these 
means-tested programs – a choice not to participate will almost certainly have a negative impact 
on the well-being of families involved.  Taxpayers responding to tax incentives that generally 
encourage the spending of discretionary income will likely have significantly less to lose when 
choosing not to behave as incentivized, so I expect these taxpayers will also be affected by 
eligibility determination complexity.   
I also predict that taxpayers will be more responsive to tax incentives structured as tax 
credits (as compared to tax deductions).  A strong preference exists for the credit structure on the 
grounds of equity and efficiency in economics and legal literature (Batchelder, Goldberg Jr., and 
                                                          
1 “Take-up” refers to the rate at which individuals eligible to receive benefits through a given program actually 
pursue and apply for those benefits. 
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Orszag 2006, Batchelder 2017, Stegmaier 2008, Furman 2008, Fischer and Huang 2013), with 
frequent calls for all tax incentives to be structured as (refundable) credits.  Similarly, writers in 
business press (Steber 2016, Lankford 2007) tend to favor the credit structure, often advising 
readers to focus their attention and effort on credits instead of deductions.   
Finally, I explore as a research question whether changes in eligibility determination 
complexity differentially affect incentives structured as credits versus deductions.  Research on 
the effect of incentive structure on taxpayer behavior is quite limited, so it is difficult to predict 
the existence and nature of an interaction between forms of complexity and incentive structure.  
The studies addressing complexity have generally held constant the tax incentive structure, so 
finding evidence of this interaction could extend our understanding of the effect of complexity 
on taxpayer response to tax incentives. 
I address my research questions and test my hypotheses by conducting an experiment.  
My experimental setting is adapted from Morrow and Rupert (2015), which uses a hypothetical 
purchase decision setting to investigate the effect of complexity (specifically, complexity in the 
form of conformity between federal and state tax laws and complexity in the form of incentive 
tax effect calculation complexity) on taxpayer purchasing decisions.  Participants are asked to 
assist a friend who is finalizing a vehicle purchase decision, which has been narrowed to two 
similar and equally-acceptable alternatives – a traditional (gas) vehicle and a hybrid vehicle.  
Participants make their recommendations (the operationalized dependent variable of interest) 
after considering the cost and features of each vehicle and the economic value of a tax incentive.  
The incentive is manipulated in eligibility determination complexity (low complexity vs. high 
complexity) and in incentive structure (credit vs. deduction), resulting in a 2×2 between-
participants experimental design.    
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Addressing these research questions using an experimental methodology is appropriate 
for two important reasons.  The experimental methodology allows me to analyze the effects of 
the variables of interest while holding constant the content (i.e., purpose, goals) and the 
economic effect of the tax incentive.  To capture the effect of eligibility determination 
complexity and/or incentive structure using existing data (i.e., publicly-available IRS data), the 
same tax incentive would need to be offered simultaneously to taxpayers in multiple structures 
and varying levels of eligibility determination complexity.  But, taxpayers respond to tax 
incentives structured as credits or deductions – they are not allowed to choose their preferred 
structure.  Further, some incentives set forth by the IRC are relatively similar in purpose, but 
have significantly different rules, limits, and exceptions, which lead to different economic 
outcomes across incentives. 
I find that eligibility determination complexity does significantly affect taxpayer response 
to tax incentives under some modeling conditions.  Participants in multiple subsamples 
responding to an incentive featuring low eligibility determination complexity provided 
recommendations significantly more in favor of the tax-incentivized hybrid model than those 
responding to an incentive featuring high complexity.  However, I do not find evidence to 
support my prediction that taxpayers will be more likely to respond to tax incentives structured 
as tax credits versus tax deductions.  I find some evidence of differences in taxpayer feelings 
toward the two structures as participants assigned to groups featuring a credit structure indicate a 
significantly greater level of certainty regarding the actual tax effect of the tax incentive 
encountered in the task than those in groups featuring a deduction structure.  Lastly, although I 
do not find evidence to suggest that participants were influenced by incentive structure alone, I 
find some evidence in various subsamples of interest of an interaction of these two variables – 
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the effect of eligibility determination complexity on the dependent variable appears, in some 
cases, to depend on the tax incentive structure. 
Understanding the extent to which eligibility determination complexity affects the 
relationship between tax incentives and taxpayer behavior is important for multiple reasons.  
First, a taxpayer facing a behavioral decision involving a tax incentive can often consider 
eligibility for a given tax incentive without consideration of detailed tax calculations and 
estimations.  Considering eligibility, therefore, is likely easier for a taxpayer to consider before 
making the decision than many other factors in the tax incentive decision context.  
Understanding the effect of eligibility determination complexity on taxpayer behavior is also 
important to policymakers.  If a tax incentive is created with the intent of changing taxpayer 
behavior, policymakers should be concerned about the possibility that some taxpayers will 
underreact to the incentive because of the complexity they encounter in determining their 
eligibility.  Legitimate reasons certainly exist to justify some level of complexity in the eligibility 
requirements associated with a tax incentive – avoiding abuse, targeting subsets of the taxpaying 
population, etc.  However, my study provides some evidence that even modest increases in 
eligibility determination complexity could be detrimental to the effectiveness of a tax incentive. 
Policymakers should also be concerned about how tax incentive structure affects taxpayer 
response to a given tax incentive.  Consideration of the structure of current and past tax 
incentives leaves open questions regarding policymaker decisions about these structures.  As 
mentioned above, I find some evidence to suggest that complexity (eligibility determination 
complexity in my study) may affect tax incentives structured as credits, but not deductions.  This, 
combined with the finding of a significant difference in certainty mentioned above, reveals that 
taxpayers respond differently to different tax incentive structures, which should inform the 
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legislative process for new tax incentives and re-designs of existing incentives.  Policymakers, it 
seems, should consider an approach that favors the tax credit structure when policy goals can be 
achieved with low eligibility determination complexity, but favors the tax deduction structure 
when higher levels of eligibility determination complexity are required.        
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:  Chapter II provides background 
information, a review of applicable literature, and develops hypotheses; Chapter III details the 
research methodology and design; Chapter IV details the analysis of results; and Chapter V 
provides a conclusion. 
  
7 
 
 
 
 
II.  BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Background 
 Policymakers generally choose from two available methods for encouraging desirable 
taxpayer behavior - direct government subsidies and incentives delivered through the Internal 
Revenue Code (commonly referred to as “tax expenditures”).  While the direct government 
subsidy approach entails sending cash payments directly to taxpayers, the tax expenditure 
approach is different.  Instead of encouraging citizens with an incentive in the form of cash, this 
approach offers an incentive in the form of a reduced tax bill.2  In their book, Taxes in America: 
What Everyone Needs to Know, Leonard Burman and Joel Slemrod present an argument for why 
politicians prefer to run programs through the IRC.  Tax expenditures, they explain, are not 
considered spending for budget purposes, and this lower level of public scrutiny makes them a 
much more politically attractive tool to encourage desirable taxpayer behavior (Burman and 
Slemrod 2013, 150-151).       
 Examples of behavior deemed desirable and incentivized by policymakers abound in the 
IRC.  Home ownership is considered to be desirable – that is, our society benefits from increased 
home ownership.  So, taxpayers were once allowed to reduce their tax bills through a tax 
incentive that encouraged home purchases by first-time homebuyers.  Charitable giving provides 
funding to charitable organizations providing goods and services that would otherwise require 
                                                          
2 An example of the government incentivizing desirable behavior directly is subsidy payments made to farmers to 
encourage the planting of certain crops or to encourage no planting to allow fields to “rest.”  Examples of “tax 
expenditures” include tax incentives such as income exclusions for health insurance premium payments and tax 
credits related to the pursuit of higher education. 
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direct government spending through government programs.  This substitution has been deemed 
desirable, so taxpayers see their taxes reduced by amounts donated to qualifying charitable 
organizations.  Entrepreneurship and risk-taking has been deemed desirable and is encouraged 
through opportunities to reduce taxes via relaxed limitations on losses incurred on small business 
stock.   
 Researchers have devoted significant attention to determining the extent to which the 
incentives delivered through the nation’s tax system actually affect taxpayer behavior.  Two such 
incentives – an incentive to encourage charitable giving (Peloza and Steel 2005, Duquette 2016) 
and an incentive to encourage investment in research and development (Bloom, Griffith, and 
Van Reenen 2002, Wilson 2009) - have garnered a great deal of attention from researchers in 
various disciplines.  This research leads to significant evidence supporting the effectiveness of 
tax incentives in changing taxpayer behavior.  
Factors Affecting Taxpayer Reaction to Tax Incentives 
Researchers in a recently-developing stream in the accounting literature, it seems, rely on 
the results of the studies above and begin with the baseline assumption that tax incentives do 
indeed influence taxpayer behavior.  Their focus shifts from whether tax incentives influence 
behavior to uncovering factors that affect the extent to which these incentives can change 
taxpayer behavior.  Morrow et al. (2018), for instance, examine (among other things) the effect 
of various demographic factors (age and experience with filing tax returns) on the effectiveness 
of a tax incentive aimed at encouraging participation in the health insurance exchanges that 
resulted from the Affordable Care Act (ACA).   
My study answers a call for additional research by Bobek et al. (2016) to better 
understand the effect of another factor affecting the relationship between tax incentives and 
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taxpayer behavior - complexity.  Morrow and Rupert (2015) initiated this stream of literature 
with a study that investigates the effect of a type of tax incentive complexity – federal / state tax 
law conformity – on taxpayer reaction to incentives aimed at encouraging the purchase of a 
certain type of vehicle.  Results of the study indicate that participants are more likely to consider 
purchasing a hybrid vehicle (instead of a nearly-identical traditional gas-burning vehicle) when 
federal and state tax incentives that encourage such behavior are similar (conforming) instead of 
dissimilar (non-conforming).  The study by Bobek, et al. (2016) followed and investigates the 
effect of complexity on taxpayer reaction to tax incentives using a different variation of 
complexity – choice complexity.  Participants were encouraged to participate in a training 
program that could lead to higher earnings with incentives that reduced the cost of the program, 
either choosing from a few incentive options or many.  Results suggest that the number of 
choices available for the same incentivized behavior (choice complexity) does not affect the 
likelihood of an individual choosing the incentivized behavior, but that more choice complexity 
does lead to errors in an individual’s ability to determine optimal choices.  
These two studies that addressed the effect of complexity on taxpayer response to tax 
incentives operationalized complexity in very different manners.  These differences in approach 
illuminate the fact that complexity is multi-faceted.  In their call for further research, Bobek et al. 
(2016) offer several suggestions as additional facets of complexity possibly worth exploration.  
My study investigates one such suggestion – complexity related to an individual determining 
eligibility to take advantage of a tax incentive, hereafter referred to as eligibility determination 
complexity.   
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Eligibility Determination Complexity  
Eligibility determination complexity varies widely among tax incentives – one can easily 
determine eligibility to take advantage of the deduction for educator expenses.  However, 
determining eligibility to take advantage of the EITC can be a daunting task.3  Researchers in 
various disciplines have addressed the idea of eligibility determination complexity (sometimes 
referred to as “hassle”) indirectly in the context of the take-up of social benefits.  The fact that 
many social programs (Medicaid programs, welfare-type programs, etc.) have low levels of take-
up is somewhat surprising as most of the media attention on these programs seems to be reserved 
for abuse in the form of individuals improperly receiving benefits.  Researchers with economics, 
public policy, and various other backgrounds have studied this take-up phenomenon extensively.  
Per Currie (2006), the literature seems to agree that individuals that are eligible but choose not to 
receive social program benefits make that choice for one or more of three reasons – “stigma, 
transactions costs, and lack of information.”   The costs associated with enrolling in various 
social programs is of particular interest in this study and is worth additional consideration.4 
To introduce and motivate her literature review, Currie (2006) points to Moffitt’s (1983) 
traditional economic model, which incorporates stigma as a cost that impacts an eligible 
individual’s utility maximization when deciding whether to enroll in welfare.  Currie (2006), 
however, states that more recent literature “suggests that other costs associated with the takeup 
                                                          
3 A comparison of relevant IRS Publications for the 2018 tax year reveals that taxpayers eligible for the deduction 
for educator expenses are described using one sentence (see IRS Publication 529 at:  https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p529.pdf) while taxpayers eligible for the EITC are described through an “EIC Eligibility Checklist” that 
includes twelve steps and references to fifteen rules (see IRS Publication 596 at:  https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p596.pdf). 
4 While stigma is certainly a factor deserving attention in the arena of public insurance and welfare programs, it 
almost certainly would not be an important factor when considering most of the behaviors incentivized through the 
IRC.  Lack of information about tax incentives could play a more important role in the relationship between a tax 
incentive and a taxpayer’s behavioral decision, but the amount of information presented in this study will be held 
constant (see below in the Methodology and Design chapter).   
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of social programs are more important than stigma,” such as “costs of learning about, and 
applying for the programs” (Currie 2006, 6).  Similarly, Bertrand et al. (2006) points to three 
factors that can affect take-up in addition to stigma – knowledge/understanding of the program 
by targeted recipients, “hassle factors” that serve as demotivation, and procrastination. 
Some of the work by researchers in other (non-accounting) disciplines has actually 
addressed the take-up of a social benefit that is delivered through the IRC and functions much 
like the tax incentives considered in this study.5  The EITC is, per the IRS (2019a), a “benefit for 
working people who have low to moderate income.”  More specifically, Burman and Slemrod 
(2013), refer to the EITC as “one of the largest antipoverty programs in the United States” (8).  
The EITC suffers, like many other social programs, from lower-than-expected take-up.  In fact, 
the most recent IRS estimates indicate that a range of approximately 77 to 80 percent of 
taxpayers eligible to receive EITC benefits actually received benefits during the 2015 tax year, 
which means approximately 21 percent of eligible individuals did not receive any benefits (IRS 
2019c).  Bhargava and Manoli (2015) send follow-up information to EITC-eligible non-
claimants in California, manipulating the presentation of various information regarding 
eligibility and other program characteristics, and find that take-up increased significantly when 
program information was more (instead of less) visually appealing and eligibility requirements 
were more concisely listed. 
Although traditional economics models have largely viewed them as inconsequential, 
factors like hassle costs and complexity associated with determining eligibility have been found 
to be more important than expected in affecting behavioral decisions in social program take-up.  
                                                          
5 This study focuses on tax incentives aimed at changing taxpayer behavior.  The EITC can only be claimed by 
individuals that earn income during a tax year.  So, the EITC would only be considered a tax incentive to the extent 
that it is aimed at encouraging working behavior in the subset of the population with the lowest levels of income. 
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The potential consequences of failing to take advantage of a benefit offered through a social 
program can be serious for these individuals and their families.  The individuals eligible for these 
means-tested programs are, by definition, around or below the poverty line in most cases.  
Choosing not to take advantage of a program such as the EITC could literally lead to a family not 
having enough food to eat during a given year.  If small hassle costs like complex eligibility 
requirements deter these at-risk eligible individuals from taking up available benefits from social 
programs, the same may be true for individuals responding to tax incentives that encourage 
desirable behaviors when these decisions almost exclusively involve a taxpayer’s discretionary 
income.  Therefore, I make the following prediction: 
H1:  Individuals will be more (less) likely to engage in a tax-incentivized behavior when 
determining eligibility for the incentive is less (more) complex. 
Tax Incentive Structure 
Tax incentive structures – exclusions, deductions, and credits – are all aimed at 
decreasing the amount of tax owed by a taxpayer, and all have been tapped by Congress to 
incentivize taxpayer behavior changes.  The decrease in tax, however, is achieved differently 
through each incentive structure.  In the simplest possible terms, income tax in the US is 
calculated as follows:  economic income is reduced by income exclusions to yield gross income; 
gross income is reduced by deductions to yield taxable income; tax is a function of taxable 
income and marginal tax rates; tax is reduced by tax credits and tax prepayments (tax 
withholding and estimated tax payments) to yield actual tax due.  Income exclusions reduce tax 
by reducing the amount of economic income a taxpayer is required to include in gross income, 
which reduces taxable income and ultimately reduces tax.  Deductions reduce tax by directly 
reducing taxable income, which ultimately reduces tax.  Finally, tax credits reduce tax due 
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“directly” on a “dollar-for-dollar” basis, with the reduction in tax occurring after tax has been 
initially calculated on taxable income.  See Figure 1 below for an illustration of this calculation. 
Figure 1 
 
Simplified Explanation of the Individual Income Tax Calculation 
 
 Income from all sources (economic income) 
less: Items specifically excluded from income 
equals: Gross income 
less: Deductions 
equals: Taxable income 
  
 Progressive tax rates applied 
  
equals: Tax (before considering credits) 
less: Tax credits and tax prepayments (i.e., withholding on salaries and wages) 
equals: Tax or refund due with return 
 
Another important difference in these tax incentive structures is each incentive’s 
relationship to marginal tax rates.  The economic value of an incentive delivered as an income 
exclusion or a deduction is directly influenced by a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate.  The same 
dollar amount of income exclusion or deduction reduces tax by different amounts for two 
taxpayers subject to different marginal tax rates.  Discussion / consideration of income 
exclusions is omitted going forward for two reasons.  First, income exclusions and deductions 
reduce tax in similar manners.  Secondly, income exclusions are certainly a large category of tax 
incentives, but generally are reserved for tax incentives involving income earned (i.e., the 
income exclusion for municipal bond interest earned) instead of money spent.  For income 
exclusion items that do involve spending, any administrative burden falls on employers (i.e., 
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income exclusion for amount of income spent on health insurance premiums) of the taxpayers 
that benefit from the incentives. 
The economic value of an incentive delivered as a tax credit is not influenced by 
marginal tax rates.  The same dollar amount of tax credit reduces tax by the same amount for two 
taxpayers subject to different marginal tax rates.  For illustration purposes, it is helpful to 
consider two single taxpayers with income levels and, therefore, marginal tax rates on opposite 
ends of a spectrum.  If the first taxpayer has taxable income of $900,000, that taxpayer’s 
marginal tax rate in the 2019 tax year would be 37 percent.  If the second taxpayer has taxable 
income of $9,000, that taxpayer’s marginal tax rate in the 2019 tax year would be 10 percent.  
So, one additional dollar of deduction reduces the wealthy taxpayer’s tax by 37 cents while one 
additional dollar of deduction reduces the low-income taxpayer’s tax by 10 cents.  One dollar of 
credit, on the other hand, would reduce each taxpayer’s tax by one dollar. 
 When analyzing tax incentive structure, relevant literature can be found in a wide array of 
disciplines.  Some accounting researchers have focused on whether behavior is most effectively 
modified through tax incentives or through other methods of reducing the net cost of a choice.  
Most recently, Stinson et al. (2018) provided evidence that tax credits are only as effective as 
price discounts offered by retailers to encourage a purchasing behavior when the price difference 
between the incentivized product and a standard alternative is high (price discounts are more 
effective when price difference is low).   
 Most of the research in this area has been offered by economists and legal experts 
focusing on which structure is theoretically more appropriate.  Very little research, however, has 
provided empirical evidence regarding each structure’s effectiveness in changing taxpayer 
behavior in the incentivized direction.  One recent study by Morrow et al. (2018) provides 
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evidence that young individuals critical to the success of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) would 
have been more likely to change their health insurance purchasing behavior in response to a tax 
incentive delivered as an increase / decrease in deductions instead of the credit / surcharge 
system created through the ACA.  This finding has important implications in the tax incentive 
literature and additional work is needed to provide broader evidence of the effect tax incentive 
structure has on an incentive’s ability to change taxpayer behavior. 
Tax credits, as detailed above, affect an individual’s tax bill differently than tax 
deductions.  The fact that deductions reduce tax due by the product of the deduction and the 
taxpayer’s marginal tax rate is undisputed.  One dollar of tax credit is, indeed, more valuable 
than one dollar of tax deduction.  Policymakers, however, do not deliver tax incentives in a 
manner that gives taxpayers a choice between a tax credit and a tax deduction for the same 
incentive.  A given tax incentive is delivered as a tax credit or a tax deduction.  An incentive 
delivered as a tax credit will almost certainly include a limit that reduces the tax effect of the 
incentive to an amount similar to the tax effect that would result from the same incentive 
delivered as a deduction.  Consider, for example, a hypothetical case of policymakers deciding to 
change the structure of the tax incentive for qualified home mortgage interest from deduction to 
credit.  A taxpayer that traditionally deducts $20,000 per year in mortgage interest leading to tax 
savings of $5,000 (assuming a 25% marginal tax rate) should expect to be allowed a $5,000 
credit such that total tax savings are equal without regard to incentive structure. 
A stream of literature addressing taxpayers’ understanding of and ability to use marginal 
tax rates in decision-making began with Gensemer, Lean, and Neenan (1965), which provided 
evidence of a general lack of awareness of marginal tax rates among many high-income 
taxpayers.  The study called attention to the possibility that economists’ assumptions of full 
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taxpayer awareness of marginal tax rates could be invalid, stating that “Such exercises in 
economic theory are significant only to the extent that taxpayers are in fact aware of their 
marginal tax rates and changes in the rates” (Gensemer et al. 1965, 258).  Several studies 
followed providing additional evidence that taxpayers are either unaware of or unable to 
accurately estimate their marginal tax rates (Fujii and Hawley 1988, Rupert and Fischer 1995), 
and that greater marginal tax rate visibility (Rupert and Wright 1998) and lower levels of 
complexity in the tax system affecting marginal tax rate determinations (Rupert, Single and 
Wright 2003) improves taxpayer decision-making. 
 Another important and related empirical question to be considered, however, is whether 
taxpayers are differentially affected by tax incentives structured as deductions or credits when 
both structures yield identical reductions in tax (i.e., the economic value of the incentive is held 
constant across incentive structures).  We might consider whether a taxpayer in the top tax 
bracket for 2019 (a 37 percent marginal tax rate) responding to a $7,500 tax credit that 
incentivizes the purchase of a fully-electric vehicle would be more or less likely to respond to a 
$20,270 tax deduction ($20,270 x 37 percent marginal tax rate = $7,500 tax savings) 
incentivizing the same purchase.  These incentives are economically equivalent, yielding the 
same decrease in tax - $7,500.  Traditional economic models that assume individuals are fully 
rational would suggest that taxpayers facing these circumstances would be equally likely to 
respond to the incentive without regard to the incentive structure.  As mentioned above, 
however, very few researchers have sought empirical evidence to support this fully rational 
behavior and freedom from heuristics and biases. 
There are some reasons to expect taxpayers to respond more favorably to deductions than 
credits.  Morrow et al. (2018) did not make directional predictions, but did suggest that 
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inexperienced taxpayers might be heavily influenced by the fact that deduction amounts will be, 
by design, significantly higher in nominal value than credit amounts that reduce tax by the same 
dollar amounts (i.e., a $1 credit is economically equivalent to a $4 deduction at a 25% marginal 
tax rate).  Morrow et al. (2018) also provides some evidence that certain taxpayers, specifically 
young, inexperienced taxpayers, are more likely to respond to deductions than credits in a health 
insurance context.  Finally, some evidence exists in favor of deductions in the allocation of tax 
incentives across structures – per Batchelder (2017), 78 percent of tax expenditures costs in the 
2016 tax year stemmed from deductions, exclusions, or deferrals while only 13 percent of costs 
stemmed from tax credits.6 
 There are, however, multiple reasons to expect taxpayers to look more favorably upon tax 
credits.  First, several previously-cited studies provide evidence that taxpayers are unaware of or 
unable to accurately determine their marginal tax rates.  The relationship between marginal tax 
rates and deductions is detailed above.  This intermediate step in calculating the economic 
impact of a tax incentive could lead to uncertainty and an aversion to the deduction structure that 
might not exist with the credit structure.  A portion of my study answers a call for research by 
Rupert and Fischer (1995) to “examine the extent to which taxpayer behavior is affected by 
uncertainty about the MTR” (53). 
Secondly, researchers in multiple disciplines often advocate in favor of the credit 
structure over other incentive structures.  Some researchers favor credits for the sake of 
efficiency.  Batchelder et al. (2006) and Batchelder (2017) indirectly discuss the definition of an 
efficient tax incentive to be an incentive that jointly maximizes social benefits (the positive 
behavioral change(s) resulting from the tax incentive) and minimizes cost in terms of reduced tax 
                                                          
6 The remaining 9 percent stemmed from “reduced rates on savings income” (Batchelder 2017). 
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revenues.  Batchelder et al. (2006) advocates strongly in favor of refundable tax credits7, 
claiming that tax incentives should benefit all households uniformly “unless the balance of the 
evidence suggests that more social benefits are generated by certain households engaging in the 
behavior than by others or that certain households are more responsive” (47).  Stegmaier (2008) 
argues that refundable tax credits are preferable in higher education incentives because other 
structures fail to encourage targeted taxpayers (those in low-income families) to pursue higher 
education.  These low-income families will be unlikely to send students to college without the 
benefit of an incentive while middle- and higher-income families (those most likely to send 
students to college without regard to tax incentives) are the only beneficiaries of education 
incentives structured as deductions and nonrefundable credits.   
While efficiency arguments focus on which taxpayers are and are not receiving benefits 
as well as the cost associated with those benefits, others present a closely-related argument in 
favor of the credit structure based on equity.8  Many have argued that wealthy taxpayers should 
not yield more tax benefit per dollar of deduction than taxpayers with lower levels of income (a 
function of marginal tax rates).  This feature of our tax system, they claim, does not fit with our 
emphasis on progressivity or vertical equity – the idea that taxpayers with greater abilities to pay 
should pay more tax.  Furman (2008) casts a spotlight on this inequity in the realm of health 
insurance tax incentives and Fischer and Huang (2013) call the deduction allowed for qualified 
home mortgage interest “ripe for reform,” advocating for a change in the incentive structure from 
deduction to credit.  Batchelder (2017), in a testimony delivered before the Senate Committee on 
                                                          
7 Most tax credits are non-refundable, but several refundable credits exist in the IRC.  A non-refundable credit can 
reduce tax due, but can never be used to reduce tax below zero.  A refundable credit can be used to effectively 
reduce tax due below zero, which could result in a refund that is larger than tax prepayments (i.e., withholding and 
estimated tax payments).  
8 There is considerable overlap in research that advocates for the credit structure for the sake of efficiency and 
research that advocates for the credit structure for the sake of equity. 
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Finance in 2017, made the case that all tax incentives should be delivered as refundable tax 
credits to end this relationship between the economic value of tax incentives and marginal tax 
rates.  Other calls to end this inequity come from presidential advisors as can be seen in reports 
issued by commissions charged by President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama to 
generate ideas for tax reform.  The Bush commission’s report presented plans aimed at 
preserving vertical equity by “shifting some tax preferences from deductions, which tend to 
benefit high-income households, to tax credits, which benefit all taxpayers equally” (The 
President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform 2005, xv).  The Obama commission’s report 
similarly advocated this switch, calling for the elimination of all itemized deductions with some 
incentives added back to the IRC in the form of credits (The National Commission on Fiscal 
Responsibility and Reform 2010). 
Another reason to expect taxpayers to be more responsive to credits is that writers in 
business press generally have written about tax incentives in a manner that favors credits.  Tax 
credits are generally portrayed to be less complex and more valuable than tax incentives 
structured as deductions.  One example of this message being delivered through the business 
press can be found in an article written by the Chief Tax Officer for Jackson Hewitt Tax Service 
(someone that can reasonably be assumed to understand tax incentives).  He wrote an article for 
the Huffington Post with a title that represents a gross over-simplification of tax incentives – 
“Tax Deductions are Good, But Tax Credits Are Better” (Steber 2016).  After referencing an 
earlier article that discussed commonly-missed itemized deductions, Steber wrote the following: 
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“Deductions though, whether standard or itemized, only reduce your amount of taxable 
income.  Credits however are figured AFTER your tax liability and therefore, reduce 
your tax bill dollar for dollar.  Credits are not only good, they are better than deductions 
and there are a lot of them.” (Steber 2016) 
Another example can be found in a 2007 Kiplinger article with a similar title – “Tax Credit vs. 
Deduction:  If you have to choose one or the other, take the credit – it’s worth more” (Lankford 
2007). 
 Finally, there is limited evidence of policymaker bias in favor of the credit structure.  
There are very few cases of tax incentives being converted from one structure to another.  Two 
such transitions, however, both featured tax incentives originally structured as deductions being 
transitioned to credits.  First, the clean-fuel vehicle deduction was in effect through the 2005 tax 
year but was converted to the hybrid vehicle tax credit beginning with the 2006 tax year (Sallee 
2011).  Secondly, an itemized deduction allowed for child and dependent care expenses was 
converted to a credit under the Tax Reform Act of 1976.  In a document prepared by the Staff of 
the Joint Committee on Taxation, the General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the 
conversion occurred to ensure the incentive was “available to those who use the standard 
deduction as well as to itemizers and so that it will provide the same tax relief to taxpayers in 
low brackets as to those in high brackets” (Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation 1976, 7).  
This language matches the theoretical justifications for favoring credits provided by economic 
and legal researchers that was detailed above (efficiency and equity).  The brief explanation is 
void, however, of documentation of policymaker consideration of the structures’ effectiveness in 
changing taxpayer behavior. 
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 Based on this evidence, I posit that the average taxpayer will view the tax credit structure 
more favorably and will be more likely to change his/her behavior in response to the tax credit 
structure.  Therefore, I make the following prediction: 
H2:  Individuals will be more (less) likely to engage in a tax-incentivized behavior when the tax 
incentive is structured as a tax credit (tax deduction). 
Relationship between eligibility determination complexity and tax incentive structure 
 It is possible that eligibility determination complexity and tax incentive structure are 
related and jointly affect a taxpayer’s response to a tax incentive – that eligibility determination 
complexity affects incentives structured as credits differently than those structured as deductions.  
Given the lack of empirical research investigating the effect of tax incentive structure on 
taxpayer response to incentives, it is difficult to predict ex ante the existence and nature of an 
interaction.  Since tax incentives are so frequently structured and delivered as credits or 
deductions, finding evidence of an interaction should inform future research on taxpayer 
response to tax incentives.  The early studies that address the effect of complexity on the 
relationship between tax incentives and taxpayer behavior feature designs that do not manipulate 
the structure of the incentive.  Morrow and Rupert (2015) employ a design which holds constant 
the incentive structure, while Bobek et al. (2016) use an abstract setting with no mention of 
incentive structure.  Developing a more thorough understanding of how complexity affects this 
relationship in different incentive structures is an important next step.  Morrow et al. (2018) 
provided some initial evidence of the importance of incentive structure, but more research is 
needed to expand our understanding of this variable.  Therefore, I will investigate the following 
research question:   
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RQ:  Does the effect of eligibility determination complexity on taxpayer response to tax 
incentives depend on tax incentive structure? 
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III.  METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
 I address my research questions by conducting an experiment, employing a 2×2 between-
participants design.  The experiment consisted of a simple judgment and decision-making task 
aimed at modeling the decision environment faced by a taxpayer incentivized to behave in a 
certain manner consistent with what has been deemed desirable.  The experimental design is an 
adaptation of Morrow and Rupert (2015), which involves a vehicle purchase decision.  I 
administered the experimental instrument through Qualtrics.  Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of four conditions that varied by tax incentive structure (credit / deduction) and 
eligibility determination complexity (low complexity / high complexity). 
Experimental Procedures 
 Participants first provided consent and were asked to assume the role of someone helping 
a friend make a vehicle purchase decision.  Participants were then informed that a friend 
purchasing a new vehicle has narrowed their decision to two choices and has asked for input.  
This design feature is different from the Morrow and Rupert (2015) design, which asked 
participants to assume the role of someone considering their own purchase of a new vehicle.  I 
made the design choice to use the “helping a friend” approach to avoid the problematic 
experimental tactic of telling participants to assume their personal income is a certain number 
(see discussion on income below).  Following Morrow and Rupert (2015), participants were told 
that the two vehicles are similar in all aspects important to the friend making the purchase 
decision, and the critical difference is that one option is a traditional (gas) model while the other 
option is a hybrid model.  Style, handling, and acceleration for each model is said to be 
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acceptable to the friend while reliability, safety, insurance costs, warranty and maintenance 
programs, purchase method (cash instead of financing), and resell timing and value are all 
consistent between the two options, and held constant across all conditions.  Limited information 
on purchase price, sales tax, fuel efficiency, and operating costs were presented to participants in 
all conditions, with a reference to a detailed specifications list to come on a later screen.   
Across all conditions, the two combinations of purchase price, sales tax, and five-year 
cost to fuel the vehicle were constructed such that the two options were basically identical in 
undiscounted total cost after considering tax savings.  The estimated five-year cost to power each 
vehicle was based on 12,000 miles of travel per year (60,000 miles total over the five year 
period).  For the traditional (gas) model, given fuel efficiency of 28 miles per gallon and using a 
gasoline price of $2.27 per gallon, the five-year cost to power the vehicle is $4,864 ((60,000 
miles / 28 miles per gallon) x $2.27 per gallon).  This amount was rounded up to $5,000 for the 
traditional (gas) model, and the estimated five-year cost to power the hybrid model ($3,500) was 
reported as 70 percent (a reflection of the relationship between fuel efficiencies of the two 
models, 28 mpg / 40 mpg = 70%) of the cost of powering the traditional model. 
The undiscounted total cost of the traditional model is $30,440:  the $24,000 purchase 
price, plus $1,440 sales tax, plus $5,000 five-year fuel cost.  The undiscounted total cost of the 
hybrid model is $30,450:  the $27,500 purchase price, plus $1,650 sales tax, plus $3,500 five-
year fuel cost, minus $2,200 tax savings for purchasing the hybrid.  The difference of $10 in 
undiscounted total cost is in favor of the traditional model, but this amount is assumed to be 
immaterial. 
 After reading the introductory information on the friend’s purchase decision, participants 
were informed that the friend may qualify for a federal tax incentive that could reduce the 
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friend’s federal income tax if the hybrid model is purchased.  Participants were also informed 
that the burden of determining eligibility to take advantage of the federal tax incentive falls on 
the taxpayer (the friend, with the help of the participant), and were provided with a list of 
eligibility requirements to consider.  After receiving the list of eligibility requirements, 
participants were provided with the detailed list of specifications for each vehicle mentioned on 
an earlier screen.  After reviewing the eligibility requirements and the specifications, participants 
received information regarding the structure (credit or deduction) of the incentive as well as 
detailed tax calculations specific to each vehicle purchase alternative.  This process is illustrated 
in detail in Figure 2, and the full instrument is provided in the Appendix. 
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Figure 2 
 
Detailed Progression of Experimental Instrument 
 
 Introduction  
Participants assume role of advisor to a friend making vehicle purchase decision 
Participants view basic information on each of two comparable and acceptable models 
identified by the friend – a traditional (gas) model and a hybrid model 
 
 Tax Incentive Eligibility  
Participants learn of availability of a federal income tax incentive for hybrid model purchases 
Participants view list of eligibility requirements friend must meet to be eligible for the tax 
incentive (manipulated – high complexity or low complexity) 
Participants view detailed list of specifications for each model 
 
 Tax Incentive Structure  
Participants informed of structure of tax incentive (manipulated – tax credit or tax deduction) 
Participants view information on friend’s estimated tax position given no vehicle purchase, the 
purchase of the traditional (gas) model, and the purchase of the hybrid model 
 
 Dependent Variable  
Participants provide a recommendation (DV) to the friend using an 11-point sliding scale: 
0 = definitely recommend traditional (gas) model, 10 = definitely recommend hybrid model 
 
 Conclusion  
Participants provide answers to various follow-up questions 
Participants provide answers to various demographic questions 
Participants conclude work in instrument and request payment 
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Independent Variables 
 I manipulated my two independent variables, incentive structure (credit vs. deduction) 
and eligibility determination complexity (low complexity vs. high complexity), between 
participants to form four treatment groups.  In the low (high) eligibility determination complexity 
condition, participants were presented with a list of two (eight) requirements that a taxpayer must 
meet to be eligible to take advantage of the tax incentive.  While the actual determination of the 
friend’s eligibility was not explicitly required, the fact that the purchase of the hybrid vehicle 
presented in the experiment was indeed eligible for the incentive was held constant across 
treatment conditions. 
In the credit (deduction) incentive structure condition, participants were told that the tax 
incentive comes in the form of a tax credit (tax deduction) and a calculation of the friend’s 
estimated income tax situation before and after considering the incentive was provided.9  While 
they are different, deductions for adjusted gross income (or “above-the-line deductions) and 
deductions from adjusted gross income (the greater of the standard deduction or the sum of 
itemized deductions) affect taxable income and tax due in the same manner (see Figure 1 above).  
So, all participants viewed tax calculations incorporating a $12,000 standard deduction 
(deductions from adjusted gross income are held constant across conditions), and participants in 
treatment groups featuring the deduction structure saw the tax incentive delivered as a deduction 
for adjusted gross income.  And, although the structure of the incentive varied by treatment 
condition, the tax effect or economic value of the incentive ($2,200 decrease in tax) was held 
constant across conditions.   
  
                                                          
9 By calculating the tax effects of the incentive and providing it to participants instead of asking participants to 
calculate the tax effects on their own, calculation complexity is effectively held constant. 
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Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable of interest for my study, Recommendation, closely parallels the 
dependent variable of interest from Morrow and Rupert (2015), which measured participant 
model preference for a personal car purchase decision using a seven-point Likert scale.  In the 
current study, I ask participants to indicate their recommendation to the friend that requested 
advice on an eleven-point sliding scale (with numbers omitted from the scale), ranging from 
“would definitely recommend the traditional (gas) model” to “would definitely recommend the 
hybrid model.”  I use an unnumbered scale to avoid potential bias related to choosing certain 
numbers and because the numbers have no meaning beyond their coding for statistical analysis.   
After providing a recommendation and without the ability to go back to change the 
response, I asked participants in all conditions to indicate whether they would have liked to have 
had additional information (yes or no) when making the decision.  An open-ended question 
followed to allow participants to indicate specific information they would have found to be 
useful.  After providing responses to manipulation and attention check questions (discussed 
below), participants were asked to provide responses to several questions aimed at understanding 
recommendations and several questions aimed at understanding preferences for tax incentive 
structures.  Participants were also asked to provide answers to various demographic questions. 
Participants 
 Participants were recruited through the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform.  I used the 
third-party service of CloudResearch, powered by TurkPrime (formerly known as TurkPrime) to 
handle posting, payments, and other administrative tasks related to the study (Litman, Robinson, 
and Abberbock 2017).  The use of this data source allowed me to recruit the most appropriate 
sample for this study – a sample that represents US taxpayers and features appropriate variability 
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in taxpayer experience, which would likely not have been attained by recruiting university 
students.10  Multiple studies have recently provided evidence that samples obtained through 
Amazon Mechanical Turk are appropriate for use in academic research.  For example, Farrell, 
Grenier, and Leiby (2017) used a three-experiment approach, finding evidence that “online 
workers are willing to report their private information honestly and to exert effort, even when 
these choices are very costly” (94).  Also, Buchheit, Doxey, Pollard, and Stinson (2018) 
conclude that “MTurk participants are reasonable proxies for nonprofessional subjects with 
limited exceptions (e.g., non-U.S. MTurk participants may be cause for concern)” (119).   
The Qualtrics instrument was accessed 1,174 times through Amazon Mechanical Turk.  
An early screening question (“How many years have you filed a federal income tax return for 
yourself / your family?”) led to immediate screen-outs of 327 participants answering “0 to 5 
years”.  Fifty unique Amazon Mechanical Turk Worker IDs were rejected payment for various 
reasons.11  Many of these 50 rejected workers logged multiple attempts, leading to a total 
reduction of 97 observations.  In addition to screen-outs and rejected payments, total 
observations was also reduced by three for participants failing to request payment.  The full final 
sample included 747 observations for unique Amazon Mechanical Turk Worker IDs receiving 
payment (see Table 1 below). 
  
                                                          
10 I used several screening tools in Amazon Mechanical Turk:  age ≥ 18, US citizen, US location at time of 
participation (with blocking of suspicious geocode locations), 90 – 100 percent approval rate for Amazon 
Mechanical Turk Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs), less than 500 HITs approved, blocking of duplicate IP addresses 
11 The most common reason for a payment rejection was the case of participants first accessing the instrument and 
answering the screening question in a manner leading to a screen-out.  The same Amazon Mechanical Turk Worker 
ID was later recorded on a subsequent attempt with the screening question answer changed to avoid screen-out.  
Other reasons for rejection of payment included invalid Worker IDs entered in Qualtrics and invalid secret codes 
entered for payment. 
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Table 1 
 
Sample Construction 
 
Times instrument accessed through Amazon Mechanical Turk 1,174 
Less:  Immediate screen-outs for low tax return experience¹ (327) 
Less:  Observations eliminated due to rejected payments² (97) 
Less:  Observations eliminated due to no payment request³ (3) 
Final Sample 747 
  
Notes: 
¹Participants responding “0 to 5 years” to the question of “How many years have you 
filed a federal income tax return for yourself / your family?” were screened out 
without pay before accessing the full instrument. 
²Payment was rejected for various reasons for 50 unique Amazon Mechanical Turk 
Worker IDs.  Many of these 50 IDs logged multiple attempts to access the 
instrument (a reason for payment rejection) such that eliminating these participants 
eliminated 97 observations. 
³Three participants logged complete attempts but never requested payment for their 
participation.   
 
Participants included in the full final sample were 36.14 years old on average, and 
approximately 66 percent indicated household income less than $75,000.  Approximately 58 
percent of participants indicated tax return experience of fifteen years or less.  Approximately 
half of the participants indicated experience filing tax returns that included deductions for AGI, 
itemized deductions, and tax credits (approximately 52, 47, and 56 percent, respectively).  All 
participants providing complete responses and properly requesting payment through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk were paid a flat fee of $2.00 for their participation, which required, on average, 
10.02 minutes of their time (an hourly wage of approximately $12 per hour).  My sample 
includes participants who are slightly younger than those in the Morrow and Rupert (2015) 
sample (63.9 percent of their sample was over the age of 45).  The distribution of participants 
across genders in my study (58.77 percent female) is approximately equal to the distribution in 
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the Morrow and Rupert (2015) study (56.4 percent female).  See Table 2 below for a full listing 
of descriptive statistics for the full sample.  
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Table 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Demographic Variables 
 
  
Age (Full Sample, n = 747) 
     Mean     36.14 
     Standard Deviation     10.11 
      
Full Sample Percentages 
  
        n  % 
Gender¹ 
     Male   306  40.96 
     Female   439  58.77 
Household Income 
     $0 - $24,999   76  10.17 
     $25,000 - $49,999   228  30.52 
     $50,000 - $74,999   190  25.44 
     $75,000 - $99,999   109  14.59 
     > $100,000   144  19.28 
Tax Return Experience 
     6 to 10 years   250  33.47 
     11 to 15 years   182  24.37 
     16 to 20 years   107  14.32 
     More than 20 years   208  27.84 
Filed Return with Deduction for AGI 
     Yes   389  52.08 
     No   358  47.92 
Filed Return with Itemized Deductions 
     Yes   351  46.99 
     No   396  53.01 
Filed Return with Tax Credits 
     Yes   421  56.36 
     No   326  43.64 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
        n  % 
Purchased Hybrid or Electric Vehicle in Past 
     Yes   71  9.50 
     No   676  90.50 
Currently Shopping for New Vehicle 
     Yes   242  32.40 
     No   505  67.60 
      
Notes:   
¹Two participants selected “prefer not to answer when responding to a gender demographic 
question.  
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IV.  ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Manipulation Checks 
 To verify the appropriateness of the manipulations of incentive structure and eligibility 
determination complexity, participants were asked several questions after providing their 
recommendations (the dependent variable).  Participants first indicated on an eleven-point sliding 
scale the level of complexity involved in determining eligibility for the tax incentive, ranging 
from (0) not at all complex to (10) extremely complex.  The mean value (standard deviation) 
indicated by participants randomly assigned to the two groups featuring low eligibility 
determination complexity was approximately 3.63 (2.68), while that of the participants in the two 
high eligibility determination complexity groups was approximately 4.25 (2.64).  This 
difference, which is statistically significant (p = .001, two-tailed), indicates that participants in 
the high complexity groups did indeed find the eligibility determination requirements to be more 
complex than those encountered by participants in the low complexity groups.   
Additionally, participants were asked to provide an assessment of the level of complexity 
involved in determining the actual tax effect the tax credit / tax deduction had on the friend’s tax 
liability, ranging from (0) not at all complex to (10) extremely complex.  A significant difference 
here would be surprising as participants in all groups were provided with the actual calculation 
of the tax effect of the incentive.  The mean value (standard deviation) indicated by participants 
randomly assigned to the two groups featuring a credit structure was approximately 3.98 (2.58), 
while that of the participants in the two deduction structure groups was approximately 4.12 
(2.57).  This difference is not statistically significant (p = .471, two-tailed), providing evidence 
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that calculation complexity differences between the credit and deduction structures was 
effectively controlled for and not likely to influence results. 
The results above are consistent with differences (or lack thereof) in the amount of time 
participants spent in the task.  Participants assigned to groups featuring high eligibility 
determination complexity spent significantly more time in the task than those in groups with low 
complexity (means of 10.48 and 9.56 minutes, respectively; p = .034, two-tailed).  However, the 
amount of time spent in the task by participants responding to a credit structure (mean = 9.95 
minutes) did not significantly differ (p = .745, two-tailed) from the amount of time spent in the 
task by those responding to a deduction structure (mean = 10.09 minutes). 
Attention Checks 
Several additional questions were used to verify participants devoted ample attention to 
the task.  These six items included task-specific questions and, following guidance from 
Buchheit et al. (2018), a question confirming participant understanding of the flat fee payment 
structure.  The results of three of these questions provided general evidence of satisfactory 
“basic” attention – most participants correctly answered questions regarding the most expensive 
option (approx. 93% answered correctly), the option with the highest five-year fuel cost (approx. 
95% answered correctly), and the structure of the payment for participation (approx. 97% 
answered correctly).  Three other questions assessed participant understanding of more 
“advanced” features of the task environment.  Approximately 80.5 percent of participants 
correctly answered a question regarding the friend’s eligibility status for the tax incentive, 
approximately 64 percent correctly identified the structure of the tax incentive (credit or 
deduction) encountered in the task, and approximately 74.2 percent correctly identified the actual 
tax effect ($2,200 reduction in taxes) of the incentive encountered in the task.  The accuracy of 
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answers provided for the actual tax effect question, however, varied markedly between groups 
assigned to credit (approx. 88.9% answered correctly) vs. deduction (approx. 59.6% answered 
correctly) conditions.  This difference leads to noticeable differences in sample size in 
subsamples constructed below.  The mean number of attention check questions answered 
correctly out of six was approximately 5.04. 
I used the results of these attention check questions to construct multiple subsamples of 
interest.  I constructed subsamples including participants correctly answering all six attention 
check questions (approx. 38.3% of the full sample, hereafter referred to as the “full attention” 
subsample), participants correctly answering the three “advanced” attention check questions 
(approx. 43.4% of the full sample, hereafter referred to as the “advanced attention” subsample), 
participants correctly answering at least five of the six (that is, any five of the six) attention 
check questions (approx. 75.2% of the full sample, hereafter referred to as the “high attention” 
subsample), and participants correctly answering the three “basic” attention check questions 
identified above (approx. 87.1% of the full sample, hereafter referred to as the “basic attention” 
subsample). 
Dependent Variable 
 The full sample mean (grand mean) of my dependent variable, Recommendation, was 
8.21 (see Table 3 below).  This measure represents a strong preference among participants for 
the hybrid model, as responses were indicated on an eleven-point sliding scale (numbers omitted) 
ranging from “would definitely recommend the traditional (gas) model” (0) to “would definitely 
recommend the hybrid model” (10).  The strong preference is likely not attributable to sampling 
people who already own hybrid vehicles – recall from Table 1 above that only 9.5 percent of the 
full sample indicated they have purchased a hybrid or electric vehicle in the past.  This 
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preference for the hybrid model is consistent with the results of the study by Morrow and Rupert 
(2015), which also found a general preference in favor of a hybrid model over a traditional (gas) 
model.  This preference, however, is stronger in my study, which can likely be attributed, at least 
in part, to my design choice to hold constant the after-tax cost of each model. 
Table 3 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Recommendation – Full Sample 
 
  
Eligibility Determination 
Complexity  
  Low High Total 
Incentive Structure 
Credit 
8.326 
(2.352) 
7.867 
(2.810) 
8.102 
(2.592) 
Deduction 
8.348 
(2.153) 
8.286 
(2.232) 
8.316 
(2.190) 
 Total 
8.337 
(2.253) 
8.081 
(2.536) 
8.210 
(2.399) 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Recommendation:  participants responded to “Considering the information presented on 
your friend’s vehicle purchase alternatives, please indicate your recommendation 
using the following scale:” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“would 
definitely recommend the traditional (gas) model”) to 10 (“would definitely 
recommend the hybrid model”) 
Eligibility Determination Complexity (EligCondition):  participants were randomly 
assigned to a group featuring a tax incentive with low (2 factors to consider) or high 
(8 factors to consider) eligibility determination complexity  
Incentive Structure (IncStructureCondition):  participants were randomly assigned to a 
group featuring a tax incentive structured as a credit or a deduction 
 
Control Variables 
I identified several potentially important control variables before conducting the 
experiment.  Morrow and Rupert (2015) and Morrow et al. (2018) include gender as a control 
variable in their analyses, and the prior includes measures of participants’ concern for the 
environment and participants’ views on tax system complexity, so careful examination of 
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differences related to these three variables is warranted in my study.  Additionally, because 
Morrow et al. (2018) provides evidence that young, inexperienced taxpayers may have different 
structure preferences than older, more experienced taxpayers, careful examination of differences 
related to age and tax return experience is also warranted.  Upon evaluation of correlations 
between variables collected, however, I found no evidence of significant correlation between the 
dependent variable and age or tax return experience.   
Dependent variable scores did not significantly vary by gender when I considered the full 
sample (means of 8.32 and 8.06 for females and males, respectively).  In fact, scores did not 
significantly vary by gender when I considered any of the subsamples constructed by attention 
check performance.  However, mean dependent variable scores did vary significantly by gender 
when I considered subsamples that captured the balance of participants omitted in the 
subsamples constructed by attention check performance.  For example, in a subsample 
constructed to exclusively include participants not correctly answering at least five attention 
check questions (the balance of the participants not included in the “high attention” subsample), 
female participants provided a significantly stronger Recommendation in favor of the hybrid 
model than male participants (means of 7.94 and 7.04, respectively; p = .033, two-tailed).  There 
was not a significant difference in mean Recommendation scores by gender for the 
corresponding “high attention” subsample (means of 8.44 and 8.40 for females and males, 
respectively).  This trend is robust across the “full attention” and “advanced attention” 
subsamples.  Among participants indicating some lack of attention to or understanding of the tax 
decision context, perhaps those making their decisions based largely on emotion, it appears that 
female participants illustrate a stronger preference for the hybrid model than male participants.  I 
examine this finding more closely below. 
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There was evidence of a significant positive correlation between the dependent variable 
and participant concern for the environment (Pollution) – preference for the hybrid model 
increases as concern for the environment increases.  Two other variables were significantly 
correlated with the dependent variable at the 0.05 level.  First, participant view of tax system 
complexity (System_Complex) was negatively correlated with Recommendation – preference for 
the hybrid model decreases as the feeling that the tax system is too complex increases.  Secondly, 
awareness of the actual tax incentive that exists in the current IRC for the purchase of hybrid 
vehicles (Aware) was positively correlated with Recommendation – preference for the hybrid 
model increases as awareness of the actual tax incentive in the current IRC increases.  The 
System_Complex and Aware variables, however, were significantly correlated with each other, so 
only the Pollution and System_Complex variables were included as covariates in the analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA) models that follow.  Table 4 below reports correlation coefficients for 
selected variables. 
  
  
 
4
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Table 4 
 
Correlation Coefficients for Selected Variables 
 
 
Rec Male Age Pollute Comp Aware D_AGI D_Item Credit TRExp Income HybEle Shop 
Rec  -.054 -.001 .345*** -.114*** .090** .005 .001 .065 -.040 -.037 .006 -.034 
Male -.029  -.128*** -.009 .037 .097*** .031 .007 -.090** -.077** .065 .092** .057 
Age -.029 -.099***  -.054 .161*** -.066 .127*** .225*** .068 .687*** .028 .016 -.150*** 
Pollute .343*** .001 -.058  -.042 .049 -.049 -.046 -.026 -.058 -.034 .016 .039 
Comp -.092** .055 .162*** .018  -.089** -.018 .060 -.058 .145*** .050 -.004 -.033 
Aware .082** .099*** -.069 .054 -.079**  .041 .041 -.016 -.090** -.029 .151*** .085** 
D_AGI .012 .031 .145*** -.054 -.014 .041  .270*** .215*** .130*** .081** .064 -.040 
D_Item -.020 .007 .226*** -.050 .067 .042 .270***  .125*** .179*** .137*** .079** .025 
Credit .066 -.090** .107*** -.036 -.051 -.016 .215*** .125***  .074** -.038 <.001 -.020 
TRExp -.053 -.077** .744*** -.057 .156*** -.085** .130*** .179*** .074**  .088** .010 -.157*** 
Income -.046 .065 .078** -.028 .058 -.027 .081** .137*** -.038 .088**  .019 -.036 
HybEle .007 .092** .025 .022 -.005 .155*** .064 .079** <.001 .010 .019  -.088** 
Shop -.015 .057 -.133*** .054 -.030 .080** -.040 .025 -.020 -.157*** -.036 -.088**  
              
Notes:  Table 2 presents Pearson correlation coefficients above the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients below the 
diagonal for selected variables.  ** and *** indicate significance (two-tailed) at the .05 and .01 levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Recommendation (“Rec”):  participants responded to “Considering the information presented on your friend’s vehicle purchase 
alternatives, please indicate your recommendation using the following scale:” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 
(“would definitely recommend the traditional (gas) model”) to 10 (“would definitely recommend the hybrid model”) 
Male:  a dichotomous variable indicating gender as male (1) or female (0) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Age:  participant age in years 
Pollution (“Pollute”):  participants responded to “I believe that vehicle-related pollution is harmful to the environment and reducing 
this pollution is important to me” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly agree”) 
System_Complex (“Comp”):  participants responded to “I believe that the federal tax system in the United States is too complex” 
using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly disagree”) 
Aware:  participants responded to “I am aware of the actual federal tax incentive that exists for hybrid vehicle purchases and this 
knowledge influenced by recommendation” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly 
disagree”) 
D_AGI:  a dichotomous variable indicating that the participant has (1) or has not (0) filed a tax return in the past that included a 
deduction for AGI 
D_Item:  a dichotomous variable indicating that the participant has (1) or has not (0) filed a tax return in the past that included 
itemized deductions 
Credit:  a dichotomous variable indicating that the participant has (1) or has not (0) filed a tax return in the apst that included a tax 
credit 
TRExp:  a dichotomous variable indicating that the participant has tax return experience of more than 15 years (1) or tax return 
experience of 15 years or less (0) 
Income:  a dichotomous variable indicating that the participant has household income of $75,000 or more (1) or household income 
of less than $75,000 (0) 
HybEle:  a dichotomous variable indicating that the participant has (1) or has not (0) purchased a hybrid or electric vehicle in the 
past 
Shop:  a dichotomous variable indicating that the participant is (1) or is not (0) currently shopping for a new personal vehicle 
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Tests of Hypotheses and Consideration of Research Question 
First, I focus on results related to participants demonstrating a high level of attention 
through performance on the six attention check questions detailed above, specifically presenting 
results from the “high attention” subsample.  Recall that the “high attention” subsample was 
constructed to only include participants correctly answering at least five of the six (any five of 
the six) attention check questions.  I found qualitatively similar results for the “full attention” 
(constructed to only include participants correctly answering all attention check questions) and 
“basic attention” (constructed to only include participants correctly answering the three most 
basic attention check questions) subsamples, so I do not separately present these results below.  
Dependent variable unadjusted means with standard deviations and adjusted means with standard 
errors for the “high attention” subsample are reported by treatment group in Panel A of Table 5 
below.  I estimated an ANCOVA model to assess the effects of eligibility determination 
complexity and incentive structure on the dependent variable.  The covariates identified above 
(Pollution and System_Complex) were also included in the model.   
I predict in H1 that individuals will be more (less) likely to engage in a tax-incentivized 
behavior when the process of determining eligibility for the incentive is less (more) complex.  
The results of the ANCOVA reported in Panel B of Table 5 provide support for H1.  The 
EligCondition variable is a significant predictor of Recommendation (F = 4.173, p = .042, two-
tailed) in the estimated ANCOVA model.  The mean values in Panel A of Table 5 indicate that 
participants in groups featuring low eligibility determination complexity issued a stronger 
Recommendation in favor of the tax-incentivized hybrid model of the vehicle.  There is also 
evidence of a significant main effect of eligibility determination complexity in the “full 
attention” and “basic attention” subsamples (not reported).  Complexity in determining eligibility 
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for a tax incentive encouraging the purchase of hybrid vehicles, it appears, has a behavioral 
effect consistent with that found in the EITC study by Bhargava and Manoli (2015).  The hassle 
cost of eligibility determination complexity affects taxpayers responding to incentives 
encouraging the use of discretionary income in a similar manner to its effect on taxpayers 
deciding whether to participate in means-tested aid programs. 
I predict in H2 that individuals will be more (less) likely to engage in a tax-incentivized 
behavior when the tax incentive is structured as a tax credit (tax deduction).  I do not find 
support for this hypothesized main effect - the IncStructureCondition variable is not a significant 
predictor of Recommendation (F = .338, p = .561, two-tailed) in the estimated ANCOVA model.  
This finding is robust as I find no evidence to support a main effect of tax incentive structure in 
any of the subsamples considered.  This lack of support for H2 suggests that taxpayer behavior is 
not differentially affected by different tax incentive structures alone.  This finding suggests that 
taxpayers seem to be rational in their consideration of tax incentives – given an equal tax effect 
there is no evidence of a general preference for one structure over the other.       
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Table 5 
 
Analysis of Recommendation for “High Attention” Subsample¹ 
 
Panel A:  Recommendation Descriptive Statistics 
 Unadjusted Adjusted n 
Group² Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Error 
 
Low / Credit 8.649 1.898 8.648 .168 148 
Low / Deduction 8.661 1.647 8.559 .184 124 
High / Credit 8.034 2.815 8.104 .169 147 
High / Deduction 8.378 2.109 8.395 .172 143 
      
Panel B:  ANCOVA Results for Recommendation 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.⁴  
Pollution³ 310.689 1 310.689 74.406 <.001 *** 
System_Complex³ 13.262 1 13.262 3.176 .075 * 
EligCondition 17.425 1 17.425 4.173 .042 ** 
IncStructureCondition 1.410 1 1.410 .338 .561  
EligCondition*IncStructureCondition 5.043 1 5.043 1.208 .272  
Error 2321.621 556 4.176    
       
Notes: 
¹The table presents unadjusted and adjusted descriptives and the results of an analysis of 
covariance for a subsample constructed to exclusively include participants correctly 
answering at least five of six attention check questions. 
²Group:  participants were randomly assigned to four treatment groups featuring combinations 
of eligibility determination complexity and tax incentive structure - “Low” / “High” = low / 
high eligibility determination complexity, “Credit” / “Deduction” = credit / deduction tax 
incentive structure 
³Adjusted means calculated with the following covariate values:  Pollution = 7.70 and 
System_Complex = 6.98. 
⁴*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  All reported p-
values are two-tailed. 
 
 
 
 45 
 
 
Table 5 (continued) 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Recommendation:  participants responded to “Considering the information presented on your 
friend’s vehicle purchase alternatives, please indicate your recommendation using the 
following scale:” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“would definitely 
recommend the traditional (gas) model”) to 10 (“would definitely recommend the hybrid 
model”) 
EligCondition:  participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax incentive with 
low (2 factors to consider) or high (8 factors to consider) eligibility determination 
complexity  
IncStructureCondition:  participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax 
incentive structured as a credit or a deduction 
Pollution:  (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that vehicle-related pollution is 
harmful to the environment and reducing this pollution is important to me” using an 11-
point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly agree”) 
System_Complex:  (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that the federal tax system 
in the United States is too complex” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 
(“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly disagree”) 
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 Although I did not find evidence to support a main effect of tax incentive structure, it is 
possible that tax incentive structure can affect taxpayer behavior through interactions with other 
variables.  I also explored, as a research question, whether the effect of eligibility determination 
complexity (EligCondition) on the dependent variable (Recommendation) depends on the tax 
incentive’s structure (IncStructureCondition).  Although not robust across the subsamples of 
interest, there is some evidence of a significant interaction.  The interaction term included in the 
ANCOVA model for the subsample constructed to exclusively include participants correctly 
answering all of the “advanced” attention check questions (questions on eligibility status, 
incentive structure, and the incentive’s actual tax effect) is significant at the 0.10 level (F = 
2.934, p = .088, two-tailed).  Mean Recommendation scores and the results of the ANCOVA for 
the “advanced attention” subsample are presented below in Table 6, Panel A and Panel B, 
respectively.   
These results suggest that the effect of a tax incentive’s eligibility determination 
complexity depends on the tax incentive’s structure.  A post hoc analysis of simple effects, as 
shown below in Table 6, Panel C, indicates that the effect of eligibility determination complexity 
is significant in the credit structure (F = 6.132, p = .014, two-tailed, Bonferroni adjustment for 
multiple comparisons), but not significant in the deduction structure (F = 0.023, p = .879, two-
tailed, Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons).  Within the credit structure, a shift from 
low to high eligibility determination complexity leads to a shift in Recommendation score 
adjusted means from 8.82 to 8.08 – a significant shift away from the incentivized hybrid model.  
Within the deduction structure, a shift from low to high eligibility determination complexity 
leads to a shift in Recommendation score adjusted means from 8.68 to 8.73 – a shift in the 
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direction of the incentivized hybrid model that is not significant.  These adjusted means are 
plotted below in Figure 3.  
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Table 6 
 
Analysis of Recommendation for “Advanced Attention” Subsample¹ 
 
Panel A:  Recommendation Descriptive Statistics 
 Unadjusted Adjusted N 
Group² Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Error 
 
Low / Credit 8.816 1.865 8.820 .221 87 
Low / Deduction 8.769 1.455 8.676 .256 65 
High / Credit 8.020 2.853 8.075 .205 102 
High / Deduction 8.729 1.809 8.730 .248 70 
      
Panel B:  ANCOVA Results for Recommendation 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.⁴  
Pollution³ 106.977 1 106.977 25.156 <.001 *** 
System_Complex³ 18.796 1 18.796 4.420 .036 ** 
EligCondition 9.305 1 9.305 2.188 .140  
IncStructureCondition 5.061 1 5.061 1.190 .276  
EligCondition*IncStructureCondition 12.477 1 12.477 2.934 .088 * 
Error 1352.288 318 4.252    
       
Panel C:  Post Hoc Analysis of Simple Effects 
Source  df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.⁴  
Effect of Eligibility Determination 
Complexity given Credit  318 26.077 6.132 .014⁵ ** 
Effect of Eligibility Determination 
Complexity given Deduction  318 .098 .023 .879⁵  
Effect of Incentive Structure given 
Low Eligibility Complexity  318 .776 .183 .669⁵  
Effect of Incentive Structure given 
High Eligibility Complexity  318 17.560 4.129 .043⁵ ** 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Notes: 
¹The table presents unadjusted and adjusted descriptives and the results of an analysis of 
covariance for a subsample constructed to exclusively include participants correctly 
answering all three “advanced” attention check questions. 
²Group:  participants were randomly assigned to four treatment groups featuring combinations 
of eligibility determination complexity and tax incentive structure - “Low” / “High” = low / 
high eligibility determination complexity, “Credit” / “Deduction” = credit / deduction tax 
incentive structure 
³Adjusted means calculated with the following covariate values:  Pollution = 7.74 and 
System_Complex = 7.04. 
⁴*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  All reported p-
values are two-tailed. 
⁵ All p-values reported for simple effects are based on pairwise comparisons of estimated 
marginal means, which reflect a Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Recommendation:  participants responded to “Considering the information presented on your 
friend’s vehicle purchase alternatives, please indicate your recommendation using the 
following scale:” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“would definitely 
recommend the traditional (gas) model”) to 10 (“would definitely recommend the hybrid 
model”) 
EligCondition:  participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax incentive with 
low (2 factors to consider) or high (8 factors to consider) eligibility determination 
complexity  
IncStructureCondition:  participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax 
incentive structured as a credit or a deduction 
Pollution:  (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that vehicle-related pollution is 
harmful to the environment and reducing this pollution is important to me” using an 11-
point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly agree”) 
System_Complex:  (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that the federal tax system 
in the United States is too complex” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 
(“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly disagree”) 
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Figure 3 
 
Effects of Eligibility Determination Complexity and Incentive Structure on Recommendation 
for the “Advanced Attention” Subsample 
 
Panel A:  Predicted Effects 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Actual Adjusted Means in the “Advanced Attention” Subsample¹ 
 
 
 
Notes: 
¹The figure plots adjusted means for a subsample constructed to exclusively include 
participants correctly answering all three “advanced” attention check questions. 
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 To this point, I have only considered subsamples constructed by attention check 
performance.  It is possible, however, that the attention check questions used to create the 
subsamples analyzed above represent general tax return experience.  The participants I recruited 
through Amazon Mechanical Turk represent a broad range of actual U.S. taxpayers.  The 
participants correctly answering the various combinations of the attention check questions might 
represent a subset of the population of U.S. taxpayers most knowledgeable about and 
comfortable with our tax system.  Similarly, it is possible that a different subset of actual U.S. 
taxpayers is not well-informed in the area of tax law and is appropriately represented by 
participants in my study that were unable to correctly answer attention check questions at a high 
rate.  It is important, therefore, to consider broader subsamples and subsamples constructed using 
alternative construction approaches. 
 First, I consider the full sample of participants successfully completing the instrument 
and receiving payment (n = 747).  Recall that the full sample mean of attention check questions 
answered correctly out of six was 5.04.  When I estimate the same ANCOVA model for the full 
sample (two independent variables of interest, their interaction, and two covariates), I find results 
that are not entirely consistent with those detailed above for subsamples constructed by attention 
check performance.  While there is still no evidence of a significant main effect of incentive 
structure (F = .994, p = .319, two-tailed), there is no evidence when analyzing the full sample of 
a significant main effect of eligibility determination complexity (F = .691, p = .406, two-tailed).  
Table 7 below presents unadjusted and adjusted means in Panel A and the results of the 
ANCOVA in Panel B. 
 Although the interaction term from the estimated ANCOVA model for the full sample is 
not considered significant (F = 2.651, p = .104, two-tailed) at traditional levels, it does warrant 
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an analysis of simple effects.  When considering these simple effects, I find evidence of a 
relationship consistent with that discussed above for the “advanced attention” subsample – the 
effect of eligibility determination complexity is significant at the 0.10 level in a credit structure 
(F = 3.007, p = .083, two-tailed, Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons), but not 
significant in a deduction structure (F = .317, p = .574, Bonferroni adjustment for multiple 
comparisons).  The shift from low to high eligibility determination complexity leads to a shift in 
adjusted means from 8.327 to 7.923 in the credit structure – a significant shift away from the 
incentivized hybrid model.  The shift from low to high eligibility determination complexity leads 
to a shift in adjusted means from 8.224 to 8.354 in the deduction structure – a shift in the 
direction of the incentivized hybrid model that is not significant.  These simple effects are 
presented below in Table 7, Panel C, and the adjusted means are plotted below in Figure 4, Panel 
A. 
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Table 7 
 
Analysis of Recommendation for Full Sample¹ 
 
Panel A:  Recommendation Descriptive Statistics 
 Unadjusted Adjusted n 
Group² Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Error 
 
Low / Credit 8.326 2.352 8.327 .163 190 
Low / Deduction 8.348 2.153 8.224 .164 187 
High / Credit 7.867 2.810 7.923 .167 181 
High / Deduction 8.286 2.232 8.354 .163 189 
      
Panel B:  ANCOVA Results for Recommendation 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.⁴  
Pollution³ 491.465 1 491.465 97.943 <.001 *** 
System_Complex³ 42.409 1 42.409 8.452 .004 *** 
EligCondition 3.469 1 3.469 .691 .406  
IncStructureCondition 4.986 1 4.986 .994 .319  
EligCondition*IncStructureCondition 13.301 1 13.301 2.651 .104  
Error 3718.241 741 5.018    
       
Panel C:  Post Hoc Analysis of Simple Effects 
Source  df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.⁴  
Effect of Eligibility Determination 
Complexity given Credit  741 15.090 3.007 .083⁵ * 
Effect of Eligibility Determination 
Complexity given Deduction  741 1.590 .317 .574⁵  
Effect of Incentive Structure given 
Low Eligibility Complexity  741 .994 .198 .656⁵  
Effect of Incentive Structure given 
High Eligibility Complexity  741 17.176 3.423 .065⁵ * 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Notes: 
¹The table presents unadjusted and adjusted descriptives and the results of an analysis of 
covariance for the full sample of 747 observations. 
²Group:  participants were randomly assigned to four treatment groups featuring combinations 
of eligibility determination complexity and tax incentive structure - “Low” / “High” = low / 
high eligibility determination complexity, “Credit” / “Deduction” = credit / deduction tax 
incentive structure 
³Adjusted means calculated with the following covariate values:  Pollution = 7.64 and 
System_Complex = 7.04. 
⁴*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  All reported p-
values are two-tailed. 
⁵ All p-values reported for simple effects are based on pairwise comparisons of estimated 
marginal means, which reflect a Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Recommendation:  participants responded to “Considering the information presented on your 
friend’s vehicle purchase alternatives, please indicate your recommendation using the 
following scale:” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“would definitely 
recommend the traditional (gas) model”) to 10 (“would definitely recommend the hybrid 
model”) 
EligCondition:  participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax incentive with 
low (2 factors to consider) or high (8 factors to consider) eligibility determination 
complexity  
IncStructureCondition:  participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax 
incentive structured as a credit or a deduction 
Pollution:  (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that vehicle-related pollution is 
harmful to the environment and reducing this pollution is important to me” using an 11-
point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly agree”) 
System_Complex:  (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that the federal tax system 
in the United States is too complex” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 
(“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly disagree”) 
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 I used an approach similar to Morrow and Rupert (2015) to create an additional 
subsample.  I split the full sample into deciles by amount of time spent in the task and eliminated 
observations for participants with times in the first and tenth deciles (hereafter referred to as the 
“middle eight deciles” subsample).  While eliminating participants not devoting enough time to a 
task is a common approach (used in Morrow and Rupert 2015), the approach used here 
recognizes that too much time spent in the task also likely represents an attention problem (i.e., 
starting and stopping, frequent distractions, etc.).  This subsample includes observations for 599 
(out of 747) participants, and unadjusted and adjusted means for this subsample are reported in 
Panel A of Table 8 below.  
I again estimated an ANCOVA model with the independent variables of interest, their 
interaction, and the Pollution and System_Complex covariates.  The results of this ANCOVA 
(reported in Panel B of Table 8 below) are qualitatively similar to the results of the ANCOVA 
for the full sample reported in Table 7 above.  Within the “middle eight deciles” subsample, 
there is no evidence of a main effect of eligibility determination complexity or incentive 
structure.  The interaction of the two independent variables of interest, while again not 
considered significant at traditional levels (p = .118), is consistent with the results from the 
ANCOVA model estimated for the full sample.  The adjusted means for the “middle eight 
deciles” subsample are plotted below in Figure 4, Panel B.  Although the means (not reported) 
are slightly different, p-values (not reported) for the covariates, the independent variables, and 
the interaction term are qualitatively similar to and lead to the same conclusions when I consider 
a subsample constructed to only exclude participants spending less than five minutes in the task 
(the approach used in Morrow and Rupert 2015). 
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Table 8 
 
Analysis of Recommendation for “Middle Eight Deciles” Subsample¹ 
 
Panel A:  Recommendation Descriptive Statistics 
 Unadjusted Adjusted N 
Group² Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Error 
 
Low / Credit 8.519 2.124 8.509 .169 156 
Low / Deduction 8.345 2.131 8.292 .173 148 
High / Credit 8.164 2.608 8.181 .182 134 
High / Deduction 8.460 2.080 8.504 .166 161 
      
Panel B:  ANCOVA Results for Recommendation 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.⁴  
Pollution³ 312.229 1 312.229 70.760 <.001 *** 
System_Complex³ 27.318 1 27..318 6.191 .013 ** 
EligCondition .506 1 .506 .115 .735  
IncStructureCondition .415 1 .415 .094 .759  
EligCondition*IncStructureCondition 10.821 1 10.821 2.452 .118  
Error 2616.606 593 4.412    
       
Panel C:  Post Hoc Analysis of Simple Effects 
Source  df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.⁴  
Effect of Eligibility Determination 
Complexity given Credit  593 7.724 1.750 .186⁵  
Effect of Eligibility Determination 
Complexity given Deduction  593 3.440 .780 .378⁵  
Effect of Incentive Structure given 
Low Eligibility Complexity  593 3.553 .805 .370⁵  
Effect of Incentive Structure given 
High Eligibility Complexity  593 7.615 1.726 .189⁵  
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Table 8 (continued) 
 
Notes: 
¹The table presents unadjusted and adjusted descriptives and the results of an analysis of 
covariance for a subsample constructed by separating the full sample into deciles by time 
spent in the task and eliminating the first and tenth deciles. 
²Group:  participants were randomly assigned to four treatment groups featuring combinations 
of eligibility determination complexity and tax incentive structure - “Low” / “High” = low / 
high eligibility determination complexity, “Credit” / “Deduction” = credit / deduction tax 
incentive structure 
³Adjusted means calculated with the following covariate values:  Pollution = 7.71 and 
System_Complex = 7.03. 
⁴*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  All reported p-
values are two-tailed. 
⁵All p-values reported for simple effects are based on pairwise comparisons of estimated 
marginal means, which reflect a Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Recommendation:  participants responded to “Considering the information presented on your 
friend’s vehicle purchase alternatives, please indicate your recommendation using the 
following scale:” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“would definitely 
recommend the traditional (gas) model”) to 10 (“would definitely recommend the hybrid 
model”) 
EligCondition:  participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax incentive with 
low (2 factors to consider) or high (8 factors to consider) eligibility determination 
complexity  
IncStructureCondition:  participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax 
incentive structured as a credit or a deduction 
Pollution:  (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that vehicle-related pollution is 
harmful to the environment and reducing this pollution is important to me” using an 11-
point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly agree”) 
System_Complex:  (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that the federal tax system 
in the United States is too complex” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 
(“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly disagree”) 
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Figure 4 
 
Effects of Eligibility Determination Complexity and Incentive Structure on Recommendation 
for the Full Sample and the “Middle Eight Deciles” Subsample¹ 
 
Panel A:  Actual Adjusted Means in the Full Sample 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Actual Adjusted Means in the “Middle Eight Deciles” Subsample¹ 
 
 
 
Notes: 
¹The figure plots adjusted means for a subsample constructed by separating the full sample 
into deciles by time spent in the task and eliminating the first and tenth deciles. 
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The “middle eight deciles” subsample eliminates participants based on time spent in the 
task, but it does not explicitly account for attention check performance.  I again considered the 
“middle eight deciles” subsample, but included an additional covariate to control for the effect of 
participant attention.  The total number of attention check questions answered correctly 
(AttnTotal) was significantly correlated with Recommendation and was not significantly 
correlated with Pollution or System_Complex.  I estimated an ANCOVA model including the 
two independent variables of interest, the two original covariates, and the AttnTotal covariate.  I 
find results that are consistent with the ANCOVA models estimated for the full sample and the 
“middle eight deciles” subsample without the AttnTotal covariate – no significant main effects 
and a significant interaction (F = 3.097, p = .079, two-tailed).  Unadjusted and adjusted 
descriptives and the results of the ANCOVA are reported in Table 9 below. 
When considering simple effects (reported in Table 9, Panel C), I find more evidence to 
suggest that the effect of eligibility determination complexity is significant in the credit structure 
(F = 2.822, p = .094, two-tailed, Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons), but not in the 
deduction structure (F = .621, p = .431, two-tailed, Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons).  Stated differently, I find that the effect of incentive structure is significant when a 
tax incentive has high eligibility determination complexity (F = 3.786, p = .052, two-tailed, 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons), but not when eligibility determination 
complexity is low (F = .258, p = .612, two-tailed, Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons).  Within the credit structure, a shift from low to high eligibility determination 
complexity leads to a shift in Recommendation score adjusted means from 8.49 to 8.07 – a 
significant shift away from the incentivized hybrid model.  Within the deduction structure, a shift 
from low to high eligibility determination complexity leads to a shift in Recommendation score 
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adjusted means from 8.36 to 8.55 – a shift in the direction of the incentivized hybrid model that 
is not significant.  These adjusted means are plotted below in Figure 5. 
I find a recurring pattern when visually inspecting the means and standard deviations of 
Recommendation for all subsamples considered to this point.  The means (unadjusted and 
adjusted) and standard deviations for three groups – the low eligibility complexity / credit group, 
the low eligibility complexity / deduction group, and the high eligibility complexity / deduction 
group – consistently form relatively tight clusters.  The high eligibility complexity / credit group, 
however, is consistently different.  This group features the lowest mean (unadjusted and 
adjusted) and the highest standard deviation across all subsamples considered to this point.  This 
finding suggests that the results of a significant main effect of eligibility determination 
complexity and a significant interaction may be driven by this group.   
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Table 9 
 
Analysis of Recommendation for “Middle Eight Deciles” Subsample with Attention Check¹ 
 
Panel A:  Recommendation Descriptive Statistics 
 Unadjusted Adjusted n 
Group² Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Error 
 
Low / Credit 8.519 2.124 8.486 .167 156 
Low / Deduction 8.345 2.131 8.364 .171 148 
High / Credit 8.164 2.608 8.073 .181 134 
High / Deduction 8.460 2.080 8.550 .164 161 
      
Panel B:  ANCOVA Results for Recommendation 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.⁴  
Pollution³ 268.344 1 268.344 62.453 <.001 *** 
System_Complex³ 25.001 1 25.001 5.819 .016 ** 
AttnTotal³ 72.920 1 72.920 16.971 <.001 *** 
EligCondition 1.888 1 1.888 .439 .508  
IncStructureCondition 4.549 1 4.549 1.059 .304  
EligCondition*IncStructureCondition 13.307 1 13.307 3.097 .079 * 
Error 2543.686 592 4.297    
       
Panel C:  Post Hoc Analysis of Simple Effects 
Source  df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.⁴  
Effect of Eligibility Determination 
Complexity given Credit  592 12.124 2.822 .094⁵ * 
Effect of Eligibility Determination 
Complexity given Deduction  592 2.670 .621 .431⁵  
Effect of Incentive Structure given 
Low Eligibility Complexity  592 1.108 .258 .612⁵  
Effect of Incentive Structure given 
High Eligibility Complexity  592 16.266 3.786 .052⁵ * 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
Notes: 
¹The table presents unadjusted and adjusted descriptives and the results of an analysis of 
covariance for a subsample constructed by separating the full sample into deciles by time 
spent in the task and eliminating the first and tenth deciles. 
²Group:  participants were randomly assigned to four treatment groups featuring combinations 
of eligibility determination complexity and tax incentive structure - “Low” / “High” = low / 
high eligibility determination complexity, “Credit” / “Deduction” = credit / deduction tax 
incentive structure 
³Adjusted means calculated with the following covariate values:  Pollution = 7.71, 
System_Complex = 7.03, and AttnTotal = 5.11. 
⁴*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  All reported p-
values are two-tailed. 
⁵All p-values reported for simple effects are based on pairwise comparisons of estimated 
marginal means, which reflect a Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Recommendation:  participants responded to “Considering the information presented on your 
friend’s vehicle purchase alternatives, please indicate your recommendation using the 
following scale:” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“would definitely 
recommend the traditional (gas) model”) to 10 (“would definitely recommend the hybrid 
model”) 
EligCondition:  participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax incentive with 
low (2 factors to consider) or high (8 factors to consider) eligibility determination 
complexity  
IncStructureCondition:  participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax 
incentive structured as a credit or a deduction 
Pollution:  (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that vehicle-related pollution is 
harmful to the environment and reducing this pollution is important to me” using an 11-
point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly agree”) 
System_Complex:  (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that the federal tax system 
in the United States is too complex” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 
(“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly disagree”) 
AttnTotal:  (a covariate) the total number of attention check questions (out of 6 total) answered 
correctly by the participant 
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Figure 5 
 
Effects of Eligibility Determination Complexity and Incentive Structure on Recommendation 
for the “Middle Eight Deciles” Subsample¹ with Attention Check 
 
 
 
Notes: 
¹The figure plots adjusted means for a subsample constructed by separating the full sample 
into deciles by time spent in the task and eliminating the first and tenth deciles. 
 
 
General Linear Model Assumption Violations 
 ANCOVA relies on several assumptions common to general linear model analysis tools.  
Two of these assumptions – normal distribution of the errors (or Gaussian errors) and 
homogeneity of variance assumptions – are not satisfied in the data collected for this experiment.  
Figure 6 below shows the Recommendation dependent variable is negatively skewed due to a 
ceiling effect – a large number of participants (approximately 44% of participants in the full 
sample) chose the highest possible value (ten on a scale from zero to ten, strongly in favor of the 
hybrid model) when making their Recommendation.  This type of departure from normality does 
not respond to data transformations (i.e., square root and log transformations).  A common 
approach, given a sufficiently large sample size (the case in my study), is to ignore the 
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assumption violations and rely on the robustness of the statistical test (ANCOVA in my study) to 
handle the violations.   
 I did, however, use an alternative approach to address the assumption violations.  I 
dichotomized the dependent variable such that participants either did or did not make a 
Recommendation of ten out of ten (i.e., the dependent variable became ten or “not-ten”).  I then 
estimated the following logistic regression model: 
RecTen = β0 + β1EligCondition_Low + β2IncStructureCondition_Credit + 
β3EligCondition_Low*IncStructureCondition_Credit + β4 Pollution + 
β5System_Complex + ε. 
The dependent variable, RecTen, equals 1(0) for participants choosing (not choosing) the raw 
Recommendation score most strongly in favor of the hybrid model (a score of ten).  The 
independent variable, EligCondition_Low, equals 1(0) if eligibility determination complexity is 
low (high), and the independent variable, IncStructureCondition_Credit, equals 1(0) if the 
incentive is structured as a credit (deduction).  The Pollution and System_Complex variables are 
also included in the logistic regression model in the same form as indicated in the ANCOVA 
models above.  
The results, however, revealed no significant relationships between the dichotomized 
dependent variable and the two independent variables of interest or their interaction.  Further, 
when I drop the interaction term from the model, which shifts the interpretation of the 
independent variable coefficients from simple effects to main effects, I find no evidence of a 
significant relationship between the independent variables and the dichotomized 
Recommendation variable (not reported).  Table 10 below reports the results of the logistic 
 65 
 
regression analysis for the full sample only, but the results of all subsamples are qualitatively 
similar. 
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Figure 6 
 
Distribution of Recommendation 
 
Panel A:  Full Sample Distribution 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Distribution by Experimental Condition 
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Figure 6 (continued) 
  
  
  
  
 
  
5 4 6 9 1 6
10 15
23 22
80
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
High / Credit
Frequency of Recommendation Score
4 2 0 2 1
9 13
29
20 22
87
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
High / Deduction
Frequency of Recommendation Score
 68 
 
Table 10 
 
Analysis of Likelihood of Strong Recommendation (RecTen) for Hybrid Model 
 
Variable β 
Odds 
Ratio S.E. 
Wald 
Statistic df Sig.²  
Pollution .276 1.318 .041 45.193 1 <.001 *** 
System_Complex -.083 .920 .035 5.724 1 .017 ** 
EligCondition_Low -.244 .784 .216 1.270 1 .260  
IncStructureCondition_Credit -.083 .920 .218 .146 1 .703  
EligCondition_Low* 
IncStructureCondition_Credit .133 1.142 .307 .188 1 .664  
Constant -1.663 .190 .429 15.022 1 <.001 *** 
Model:        
n = 747        
χ2 = 58.258***        
Cox and Snell R2 = .075        
 
Notes: 
¹The table presents the results of a logistic regression analysis for the full sample. 
²*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  All reported p-
values are two-tailed. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
RecTen:  participants responded to “Considering the information presented on your friend’s 
vehicle purchase alternatives, please indicate your recommendation using the following 
scale:” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“would definitely recommend the 
traditional (gas) model”) to 10 (“would definitely recommend the hybrid model”) – coded as 
1 if 10 and 0 if any score other than 10 
EligCondition_Low:  participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax incentive 
with low (2 factors to consider) or high (8 factors to consider) eligibility determination 
complexity – coded as 1 if low and 0 if high 
IncStructureCondition_Credit:  participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax 
incentive structured as a credit or a deduction – coded as 1 if credit and 0 if deduction 
Pollution:  (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that vehicle-related pollution is 
harmful to the environment and reducing this pollution is important to me” using an 11-
point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly agree”) 
System_Complex:  (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that the federal tax system 
in the United States is too complex” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 
(“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly disagree”) 
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 This finding, however, can be explained to some extent through a close (visual) 
examination of the distributions for each of the experimental conditions shown above in Figure 
6.  As can be seen in Panel B, the frequencies of high scores (those strongly in favor of the 
hybrid model) are approximately equal across the experimental conditions and the sample sizes 
of the groups are also approximately equal.  The independent variables are not significant in the 
logistic regression model above, at least in part, because there is little variation in the distribution 
of the dichotomized (ten vs. “not-ten”) dependent variable across groups.  The independent 
variables perform poorly in predicting scores of ten and “not-ten” because the variation in raw 
Recommendation scores occurs on the bottom half of the eleven-point scale (the half in favor of 
the traditional model). 
I do find when looking at the distributions, however, a higher frequency of scores on the 
lower half of the eleven-point scale (scores 0 through 4) in the group that responded to a tax 
credit with high eligibility determination complexity.  This finding is consistent with and 
provides an explanation for the inflated standard deviation values for this group compared to the 
other three groups as can be seen in Table 5, Table 6, Table 7, Table 8, and Table 9.  It is also 
consistent with the ANCOVA results above that indicate a significant effect of eligibility 
determination complexity in the credit condition – participants in the high eligibility 
determination complexity / credit group more frequently made recommendations in favor of the 
traditional model (scores 0 through 4).   
Supplemental Analysis:  Open-Ended Questions 
Participants provided responses to several follow-up questions after making their vehicle 
purchase recommendations.  First, I used an open-ended question to ask participants to indicate 
the important factors that motivated their recommendations.  Most comments indicated 
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preference for the hybrid model, which is consistent with the full sample mean Recommendation 
score strongly in favor of the hybrid model.  The participants that recommended against the 
hybrid often indicated they felt hybrid vehicles are too expensive to maintain.  Many of the 
participants recommending in favor of the hybrid model cited lower fuel costs and lower 
environmental impact.  Participants commonly indicated that the hybrid model was the “easy 
choice” because the tax incentive made it the same overall price as the traditional model – a clear 
indication of the effect of a tax incentive that effectively equalizes prices. 
I used a second open-ended question to ask participants what additional information they 
would have preferred to have when making their recommendation.  Some of the more common 
responses included the type / distance of normal driving for the friend, information regarding 
battery maintenance costs for the hybrid model, availability of public recharging stations, and a 
guarantee of eligibility for the incentive.  This desire to see a guarantee of eligibility is an 
indication of the effect of eligibility determination complexity as some participants were 
apprehensive about recommending the hybrid model without perfect confidence regarding 
eligibility.   
Supplemental Analysis:  Certainty 
Participants also answered a question regarding their level of certainty about how the 
incentive would affect their friend’s tax liability.  The level of certainty was indicated on an 11-
point sliding scale ranging from 0 (not at all certain) to 10 (highly certain).  In the full sample, 
the mean value of certainty indicated by participants in the credit structure groups was 
approximately 6.83, compared to a mean value of approximately 5.97 for participants in the 
deduction structure groups (a significant difference, p = <0.001).  This finding is robust – mean 
values of certainty are significantly greater for participants responding to credits in all 
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subsamples mentioned above.  Further, the mean value of certainty does not significantly differ 
between low and high eligibility determination complexity in the full sample or any of the 
subsamples mentioned above.  Because of the relationship with the marginal tax rate, credits 
have been deemed to entail more certainty than deductions for how much actual tax savings will 
accrue to a taxpayer when engaging in incentivized behavior and taking advantage of an 
incentive.  This uncertainty, however, should have been effectively eliminated by design as the 
economic value of the incentive was held constant across incentive structure levels and the 
calculation of the tax effect was presented in the instrument.   
This difference is especially interesting when considered alongside participant responses 
to other questions.  As discussed above, responses to the manipulation check question regarding 
complexity in determining the incentive’s actual tax effect were not significantly different 
between structure conditions.  Three other follow-up questions aimed at uncovering a general 
taxpayer bias for one incentive structure over the other also failed to reveal strong preferences.  
Participants were asked to indicate on 11-point sliding scales (0 in favor of tax credit and 10 in 
favor of tax deduction) the structure they generally preferred (mean response approx. 4.94), the 
structure they found to be easiest to handle (mean response approx. 5.06), and the structure they 
found to be most valuable (mean response approx. 4.93).  These seemingly-conflicting results 
suggest that average taxpayers are more comfortable dealing with tax incentives structured as 
credits, but are generally unaware of or unwilling to disclose their bias. 
Supplemental Analysis:  Gender 
As indicated above, I found some evidence of differences by gender when considering 
subsamples constructed to exclusively include participants not correctly answering various 
combinations of attention check questions.  Among all subsamples constructed by attention 
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check performance, the “advanced attention” subsample provides the most even split of 
observations – 324 participants correctly answered all three advanced attention questions and 
423 did not.  Recall that the “advanced attention” subsample was constructed to only include 
participants correctly answering questions on the “advanced” features of the task environment 
(questions on eligibility status, incentive structure, and the incentive’s actual tax effect).  So, I 
split a subsample constructed to exclusively include participants not correctly answering the 
three “advanced” attention check questions by gender and estimated the same ANCOVA model 
from above for each new gender-specific subsample.   Adjusted means and the results of the 
ANCOVAs are reported below in Table 11. 
I find evidence of a significant interaction in the female-only subsample, but no evidence 
of an interaction in the male-only subsample.  In fact, males and females not performing well on 
the attention check questions responded quite differently to the tax incentives in the task.  I find 
when analyzing the interaction in the female-only subsample that the effect of eligibility 
determination complexity is significant given a credit structure (F = 3.700, p = .056, Bonferroni 
adjustment for multiple comparisons), but not in a deduction structure (F = 2.640, p = .105, 
Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons).  Stated differently, the effect of incentive 
structure is significant given high eligibility determination complexity (F = 6.944, p = .009, 
Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons), but is not significant when eligibility 
determination complexity is low.  Within the credit structure, a shift from low to high eligibility 
determination complexity leads to a shift in Recommendation score adjusted means from 8.30 to 
7.53 – a significant shift away from the incentivized hybrid model.  The adjusted means for 
males and females are plotted below in Figure 7. 
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Table 11 
 
Analysis of Recommendation for Subsamples by Gender¹ 
 
Panel A:  Recommendation Descriptive Statistics by Gender 
   
 Male Female 
Group² 
Adj. 
Mean³ 
Std. 
Error n 
Adj. 
Mean³ 
Std. 
Error n 
Low / Credit 7.285 .433 39 8.300 .264 64 
Low / Deduction 7.919 .393 47 7.986 .244 75 
High / Credit 7.853 .515 27 7.533 .299 50 
High / Deduction 7.455 .423 41 8.540 .238 78 
      
Panel B:  ANCOVA Results for Males 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.⁴  
Pollution³ 189.083 1 189.083 26.638 <.001 *** 
System_Complex³ 7.837 1 7.837 1.104 .295  
EligCondition .100 1 .100 .014 .906  
IncStructureCondition .504 1 .504 .071 .790  
EligCondition*IncStructureCondition 9.318 1 9.318 1.313 .254  
Error 1050.522 148 7.098    
       
Panel C:  ANCOVA Results for Females 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.⁴  
Pollution³ 163.920 1 163.920 37.091 <.001 *** 
System_Complex³ 15.112 1 15.112 3.419 .066 * 
EligCondition .728 1 .728 .165 .685  
IncStructureCondition 7.680 1 7.680 1.738 .189  
EligCondition*IncStructureCondition 28.059 1 28.059 6.349 .012 ** 
Error 1153.470 261 4.419    
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Table 11 (continued) 
 
Panel D:  Post Hoc Analysis of Simple Effects for Females 
Source  df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.⁴  
Effect of Eligibility Determination 
Complexity given Credit  261 16.351 3.700 .056⁵ * 
Effect of Eligibility Determination 
Complexity given Deduction  261 11.668 2.640 .105⁵  
Effect of Incentive Structure given 
Low Eligibility Complexity  261 3.371 .763 .383⁵  
Effect of Incentive Structure given 
High Eligibility Complexity  261 30.690 6.944 .009⁵ *** 
       
Notes: 
¹The table presents adjusted descriptives and analysis of covariance results for subsamples 
constructed to exclusively include male participants not correctly answering all three 
“advanced” attention check questions and female participants not correctly answering all 
three “advanced” attention check questions. 
²Group:  participants were randomly assigned to four treatment groups featuring combinations 
of eligibility determination complexity and tax incentive structure - “Low” / “High” = low / 
high eligibility determination complexity, “Credit” / “Deduction” = credit / deduction tax 
incentive structure 
³Adjusted means calculated with the following covariate values:  Pollution = 7.53, 
System_Complex = 7.05 for males; Pollution = 7.58, System_Complex = 7.04 for females. 
⁴*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  All reported p-
values are two-tailed. 
⁵ All p-values reported for simple effects are based on pairwise comparisons of estimated 
marginal means, which reflect a Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Recommendation:  participants responded to “Considering the information presented on your 
friend’s vehicle purchase alternatives, please indicate your recommendation using the 
following scale:” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“would definitely 
recommend the traditional (gas) model”) to 10 (“would definitely recommend the hybrid 
model”) 
EligCondition:  participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax incentive with 
low (2 factors to consider) or high (8 factors to consider) eligibility determination 
complexity  
IncStructureCondition:  participants were randomly assigned to a group featuring a tax 
incentive structured as a credit or a deduction 
Pollution:  (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that vehicle-related pollution is 
harmful to the environment and reducing this pollution is important to me” using an 11-
point sliding scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly agree”) 
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Table 11 (continued) 
 
System_Complex:  (a covariate) participants responded to “I believe that the federal tax system 
in the United States is too complex” using an 11-point sliding scale ranging from 0 
(“strongly disagree”) to 10 (“strongly disagree”)  
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Figure 7 
 
Effects of Eligibility Determination Complexity and Incentive Structure on Recommendation 
for Subsamples¹ by Gender 
 
Panel A:  Actual Adjusted Means for Males 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Actual Adjusted Means for Females 
 
 
 
Note:   
¹The figure plots adjusted means for subsamples constructed to exclusively include male 
participants not correctly answering all three “advanced” attention check questions and 
female participants not correctly answering all three “advanced” attention check questions. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
In this study, I conduct an experiment to examine whether eligibility determination 
complexity and tax incentive structure affect taxpayers’ willingness to engage in tax-incentivized 
behavior.  In the task, which is adapted from Morrow and Rupert (2015), I ask participants to 
make a recommendation to a friend deciding between two nearly-identical vehicle purchase 
alternatives – a traditional (gas) model and a hybrid model.  Participants are informed that a 
federal income tax incentive is available for eligible taxpayers purchasing the hybrid model.  
Participants recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk were randomly assigned to one of four 
treatment conditions that manipulated eligibility determination complexity (low complexity / 
high complexity) and tax incentive structure (credit / deduction). 
My study answers a call for additional research on tax incentive complexity by Bobek et 
al. (2016), as I predict and find evidence that suggests eligibility determination complexity can 
significantly impact the behavior of taxpayers responding to tax incentives under some modeling 
conditions.  Specifically, I find evidence that taxpayers are more likely to respond to tax 
incentives when determining eligibility is relatively easy.  Analyzing subsamples constructed to 
exclusively include participants correctly answering various combinations of attention check 
questions, I find that participants responding to a tax incentive with low eligibility determination 
complexity provided significantly stronger recommendations in favor of the tax-incentivized 
hybrid model than those responding to a tax incentive featuring high eligibility determination 
complexity.   
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I also predict, but do not find evidence that tax incentive structure alone influences 
taxpayer response to tax incentives.  Participants responding to a tax incentive structured as a tax 
credit provided recommendations that were not significantly different from those provided by 
participants responding to an incentive structured as a tax deduction.  Further, I do not find this 
result to differ between younger and older taxpayers – incentive structure alone did not influence 
recommendations for participants of any age or level of tax return experience.  This finding is 
mixed in its consistency with the results of Morrow et al. (2018), which provided evidence of a 
deduction preference only among younger, less experienced taxpayers.  While Morrow et al. 
(2018) find evidence that only older, more experienced taxpayers act rationally when responding 
to tax incentives of different structures but identical economic values (i.e., they have no 
preference for one structure over the other), I find evidence of this rational behavior in 
participants of all ages and experience levels. 
Although I do not predict an interaction, I investigate the possibility of an interaction 
between eligibility determination complexity and incentive structure as a research question.  
When analyzing certain subsamples of interest, I find that the main effect of eligibility 
determination complexity diminishes.  I find evidence instead to suggest that taxpayers are only 
influenced by eligibility determination complexity when responding to tax incentives structured 
as credits.  Specifically, taxpayers responding to credits seem to be less likely to behave as 
incentivized when the credit features a high level of eligibility determination complexity.  The 
results of my study, therefore, are consistent with Morrow and Rupert (2015), which provides 
evidence that taxpayers are more likely to respond to tax incentives when dealing with a less 
complex incentive.  I extend Morrow and Rupert (2015), however, by providing evidence 
suggesting that this effect may only apply to tax incentives structured as credits. 
 79 
 
The effects of these variables seem to vary across different groups of taxpayers.  
Taxpayers most familiar and comfortable with the mechanics of our tax system (those 
represented in my study by participants correctly answering attention check questions at high 
rates) seem to be less likely to respond to tax incentives of either structure (credit or deduction) 
when eligibility determination complexity is high (a main effect of eligibility determination 
complexity).  It seems, however, that taxpayers in general – those represented in my study by 
broader subsamples not constructed through attention check performance – are only less likely to 
respond to tax incentives with high eligibility determination complexity when the incentives are 
structured as credits.  
This finding of an interaction in my study is an important extension of the tax incentive 
complexity literature.  Evidence suggesting the effect of a form of tax incentive complexity 
(eligibility determination complexity in my study) depends on the structure of the tax incentive is 
an important finding as we interpret the results of existing studies in this area (i.e., Morrow and 
Rupert 2015 and Bobek et al. 2016) and continue to develop new studies aimed at understanding 
the effect of tax incentive complexity on taxpayer behavior.  When possible and appropriate, 
researchers studying this effect should consider the possibility of a tax incentive structure 
interaction during the design phase of future experiments. 
I also find some evidence of a difference in taxpayer feelings toward the incentive 
structures as participants responding to a tax credit indicated a significantly higher level of 
certainty regarding the actual tax effect of the tax incentive encountered in the task than those 
responding to a tax deduction.  I provided participants with the actual calculations of tax, 
effectively holding constant calculation complexity.  So, this finding suggests that taxpayers are 
in some way uncomfortable with the relationship between deductions and the marginal tax rate.  
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While prior literature has detailed taxpayer discomfort in using and interacting with marginal tax 
rates (i.e., Fujii and Hawley 1988, Rupert and Fischer 1995, Rupert and Wright 1998, and Rupert 
et al. 2003), I find evidence to suggest that the discomfort is present even when taxpayers are not 
required to incorporate the marginal tax rate into calculations.   
Finally, the gender-related results of my study are mixed in their consistency with prior 
literature.  In all of the analysis presented above on the main samples of interest, I do not find 
evidence to suggest gender is significantly related to Recommendation.  This finding is consistent 
with Morrow et al. (2018) – gender was included in all regression models reported in their study, 
but was never significant.  On the other hand, in my analysis of subsamples constructed to 
exclusively include participants not answering various combinations of attention check 
questions, I find that gender is significantly related to Recommendation.  This finding is 
consistent with Morrow and Rupert (2015) – gender is a significant covariate in the main 
ANCOVA analysis provided in their study.  These mixed results should lead to a close 
examination of the effect of gender in future studies as it seems, from the results of my study, 
that the effect of gender might only affect certain subsamples and, by extension, certain subsets 
of the population of taxpayers. 
This study makes several other important contributions.  First, it extends the tax literature 
that addresses the effect of complexity on the effectiveness of tax incentives by addressing a 
previously unexplored aspect of complexity – eligibility determination complexity.  This aspect 
of complexity is important because eligibility determination is often determinable without 
detailed calculations and estimations of tax effects.  Eligibility determination, therefore, is a 
decision factor a taxpayer can more easily consider before making a decision than many other 
factors in the decision context of a tax incentive.    
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My study also expands this stream of tax literature by further addressing the effect of a 
variable we know very little about - incentive structure.  My study is one of the first to 
incorporate a design that does not hold constant incentive structure.  As stated above, this 
variable can only be studied reliably using an experimental methodology as tax incentives are 
delivered to taxpayers as tax credits or tax deductions.  I employ a design that allows me to 
investigate taxpayer response to exactly the same tax incentive delivered as a credit and a 
deduction. 
My study also provides evidence that should be of interest to tax policymakers as I find 
that even a modest change in eligibility determination complexity can have a significant impact 
on a taxpayer’s response to a tax incentive.  This information should be important to 
policymakers writing new and modifying existing tax laws aimed at changing taxpayer behavior.  
Developing a better understanding of the effect of tax incentive structure should be important to 
policymakers for the same reason.  As noted above, Batchelder et al. (2006), Stegmaier (2008), 
and others use equity and efficiency arguments to advocate in favor of a move to exclusively use 
the refundable tax credit structure.  Given tax incentives with low levels of eligibility 
determination complexity, this could be a reasonable and equitable approach.  The results of my 
study, however, suggest that taxpayers responding to tax credits featuring high levels of 
eligibility determination complexity may be less likely to behave as incentivized.  When high 
eligibility complexity is required in a tax incentive aimed at changing taxpayer behavior, it 
seems policymakers should actually favor the deduction structure.   
  Finally, this study also contributes to the literature that addresses the take-up of social 
benefits as it extends our understanding of the effect of hassle costs across different programs 
and demographics.  The same hassle cost (that of determining eligibility) that keeps taxpayers 
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with the lowest levels of income from applying for social benefits like Medicaid and taking 
advantage of the EITC also seems to make taxpayers of diverse income levels less likely to 
engage in tax-incentivized behaviors.  I find that this may be especially true within tax incentives 
structured as credits, which as noted above, are championed by many legal experts as the most 
appropriate structure for tax incentives.  These experts, it seems, are lobbying for a wholesale 
shift in the direction of an incentive structure that could lead to poor taxpayer response to 
incentives with high levels of eligibility determination complexity. 
This study has multiple limitations that lead to future research opportunities in the 
context of complexity in tax incentives.  I made a design choice in my study to manipulate tax 
incentive structure as deduction for adjusted gross income vs. credit.  This is a limitation in that 
although the two types of deductions affect tax in the same manner, I am unable to rule out the 
possibility that taxpayers could respond differently to tax incentives structured as deductions 
from adjusted gross income (itemized deductions).  But, this limitation also provides 
opportunities for future research as the type of deduction can and should be manipulated in 
future studies. 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (hereafter, TCJA 2017) certainly changed the 
landscape for tax incentives.  During the 2016 tax year (pre-TCJA 2017), approximately 30 
percent of individual taxpayers elected to itemize deductions – a majority of taxpayers claimed 
the standard deduction (IRS 2018, 20).  These numbers, however, reflect taxpayer deduction 
behavior when the standard deduction was approximately half the amount it was for the 2018 tax 
year (post-TCJA 2017).  The increases in standard deduction amounts will certainly lead to an 
even smaller percentage of the population electing to itemize deductions, and the discussion of 
deduction versus credit for tax incentives will be affected.  Howard Gleckman, senior fellow at 
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the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, predicted that less than ten percent will itemize post-
TCJA 2017 (Gleckman 2017).  His estimate was reasonably accurate – early data released by the 
IRS reveals that approximately 10.4 percent of taxpayers filing 2018 tax returns through July 
2019 chose to itemize deductions (IRS 2019b).   
This change in the incentive landscape could lead to some combination of two possible 
outcomes.  One possibility is that policymakers could begin to rely primarily on credit structures 
for new incentives while shifting existing incentives from itemized deduction to credit structures.  
Another alternative would be to shift existing and new incentives from deductions from adjusted 
gross income (itemized deductions) to deductions for adjusted gross income (or “above-the-line 
deductions”) (Gleckman 2017).  Although the landscape has changed drastically, it is highly 
unlikely that policymakers will adopt a model that exclusively uses credit structures to deliver 
tax incentives.  If this shift does occur, I provide evidence that it could negatively impact 
taxpayer response when eligibility determination complexity is high.  Until then, developing a 
better understanding of how incentive structure affects taxpayer reaction to incentives will 
continue to be an important issue. 
Additionally, my study does not manipulate the refund/tax due position of the taxpayer.  
In fact, my instrument ends the tax calculation presented to participants without presenting tax 
prepayment or a tax due / tax refund position.  I find that participants in my study were 
significantly influenced in the direction of the incentivized hybrid model based on the tax 
savings alone.  Future research could extend my study by considering whether those tax savings 
differentially affect taxpayer behavior when leading to a reduction of tax due vs. an increase in 
tax refund. 
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Another factor not addressed or manipulated in my study is the amount of time that 
passes between the decision to behave in the tax-incentivized direction and the filing of a tax 
return that allows a taxpayer to realize the related tax benefit.  Again, future research could 
consider the effect of this time lag on taxpayer response to tax incentives.   
Finally, my study features a choice between comparable alternatives for which the after-
tax, long-term cost of the tax-incentivized alternative is approximately equal to the cost of the 
alternative not incentivized.  Many participants in my study indicated this to be an important 
factor in the recommendation in favor of the hybrid model.  Future research should also consider 
taxpayer behavior in choice environments where the tax-incentivized alternative has a greater 
after-tax cost than the non-incentivized alternative. 
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